




THE burgeoning responsibilities of the federal government in providing for
the defense and welfare of the nation have caused it to enter into an increasing
number of supply and construction contracts with private parties.
1 These
contracts are the basis of a complex of relationships to which considerations
of both administrative 2 and commercial law 3 must be brought to bear. Be-
cause of the hybrid nature of the problem, contract disputes resolution has been
uncertainly and unsatisfactorily allocated among institutions in the several
branches of the government.
Since there is little statutory guidance in this area,4 the fundamental source
of this allocation has been a system of contract clauses governing the resolu-
tion of disputes. 5 For most contractors the standard form government contract
1. For discussion of the striking impact of government procurement spending on the
private sector, see Hannah, Government Buying Erodes Management, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
May-June 1964, pp. 53-54. The Chairman of the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA), Louis Spector, has pointed out that over half of the national budget,
approximately $100 billion, is devoted to defense, and that over half of defense expendi-
tures ($30 billion) is disposed of by contracts with the private sector. Over 9 million
separate contract actions are entered into by the Department of Defense each year. Inter-
view with ASBCA Chairman Spector, Washington, D.C., June 1, 1964 (hereinafter cited
as Spector Interview).
Running the program which handles the disputes arising out of this giant purchasing
effort is expensive. According to testimony before the Hebert subcommittee, it cost
$408,000 to operate the ASBCA in fiscal 1958. Spector Interview.
2. Commentators have come to refer to government contracts as "Instruments of
Administration." For the development of this idea, see, e.g., Miller, Government Contracts
and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. Rxv. 27 (1955) ; Miller, Adminis-
tration by Contract: A New Concern for the Administrative Lawyer, 36 N.Y.U.L. REy.
957 (1961).
3. See Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals,
29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 39, 43 (1964); Braucher, Arbitration Under Government
Contracts, 17 LAw & CONTEM'. PROa. 473 (1952). For discussion of the general similar-
ities and differences of government contract law and private law, see CUNEO, GOVERN-
MENT CONTRACTS HANDBOO 251-57 (1962).
4. The only formal legislation directly bearing on this area is the so-called "Wunder-
lich Act," 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1958). See Spector, Anatomy of a
Dispute, 20 FED. B.J. 398, 400 n.10 (1960).
5. The basic clause out of which the formal machinery for reviewing contract dis-
putes has grown is the "disputes clause." See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A, cl. 6 (1964)
(construction contracts) ; 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-32, cl. 12 (1964) (supply contracts).
Nor should the importance of unilaterally issued regulations be underestimated. See,
e.g., Stone, Contract by Regulation, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 32 (1964).
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is, in effect, a contract of adhesion whose terms must be accepted if he wishes
to do business with the government. 6 The contractor accepts as part of the
contract a battery of clauses providing that the government contracting officer
adjust anticipated disputes arising during the performance of the contract.
7
Institutions and procedure to resolve disputes under these operational clauses
are highly developed, and have long been a matter of concern and debate.
It is upon this area - enforcement and administration of government contract
provisions - that this Comment will focus its attention.
For many years, government contracts have contained clauses which pro-
vide for "finality":
Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning
a question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by
agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer. .... 8
These clauses are not without historical and commercial precedent.9 Because
of difficulty in communication, they were in use as early as the Indian Wars. 0
It may be doubtful whether this historical justification is still tenable in the
modern context, but finality arrangements are common and deemed necessary
in a wide variety of commercial settings. For example, arbitration clauses
providing for final dispute settlements are often used to insure speed and
certainty of decision; some of these clauses even provide that only one of the
parties to the dispute may select the arbitrator.".
6. One commentator has estimated that ninety percent of language in these contracts
is prescribed by the government. Id. at 32.
This adhesionary tendency has resulted in a sharp infringement of private management
functions. See Hannah, supra note 1, at 55-62.
7. "Changes" Clause, 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-32, cl. 2 (1964); "Changed Conditions,"
41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A, cl. 4 (1964); "Government Furnished Property," 32 C.F.R.
§ 13.502 (1961) (fixed price contracts); "Inspection," 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-32, ci. 5
(1964) ; "Termination-for-Convenience," 32 C.F.R. § 8.701 (1961) (fixed price contract).
Equitable Adjustments are authorized by these clauses, which provide that failure to
agree to adjustments under them are disputes over questions of fact within the meaning
of the disputes clause. The mechanics of these clauses are discussed in CUNEO, op. cit.
.stpra note 3, at 46-58, 112-42. For statements of the principles applied in the execution
of these clauses, see Spector, Confiusion in the Concept of the Equitable Adjustment in
Government Contracts, 22 FED. B.J. 5 (1962) ; see also McBride, Confusion in the Con-
cept of Equitable Adjustments in Government Contracts: A Reply, 22 FED. B.J. 235
(1962).
8. 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A, cl. 6 (1964).
9. For an extended development of the history of finality in disputes clauses, see
Shedd, supra note 3, at 43-57.
10. The Secretary of War could not, for example, check whether there were weevils
in the flour supplied to troops in the inaccessible Far West and personally decide whether
the suppliers should be paid; final responsibility clearly had to rest with the men in the
field. Hearings on H.R. 1839 and S. 24 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 1st & 2d Sess. 19 (1954) (Testimony of Alan Johnstone at
hearings on "Review of Finality Clauses in Government Contracts").
11. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 794-803 (1936); 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 652
(1960). Architects often arbitrate disputes to which either they or their principles are
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The Supreme Court upheld such a "finality" clause in a government contract
when it first faced the problem in 1878.12 The parties had bargained for the
terms of the contract, proclaimed the Court, and therefore they should be
bound. "In the absence of fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily
imply bad faith or a failure to exercise an honest judgment ... [the contract
officer's] action in the premises is conclusive upon the appellant as well as the
government."'
13
The Supreme Court, however, soon expanded the grounds for overturning
departmental decisions to include caprice and lack of due regard to the rights
of the contracting parties,' 4 and in a string of subsequent decisions, the Court
of Claims added several additional tests, including arbitrariness and lack of
substantial evidence.' 5 Congress confirmed this trend in 1954 through enact-
ment of the Wunderlich Act.16 This expansion of the scope of judicial review
probably reflected a balancing of considerations. On one hand, commercial and
parties. See, e.g., M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 184 F. Supp. 907
(D. Maine 1960) ; Parke v. Pence Springs Co., 94 W. Va. 382, 118 S.E. 508 (1923).
The Supreme Court has upheld contracts between private parties which provide that
an employee of one of them is to be the finder of facts in the event of a dispute. E.g.,
Martinsburg & P.R.R. v. March, 114 U.S. 549 (1885). See also Terminal Constr. Corp.
v. Bergen County Sewer Dist. Auth., 34 N.J. Super. 478, 112 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. 1954),
modified, 18 N.J. 294, 113 A.2d 787 (1955). For staunch advocacy of the arbitration
analogy, see Joy, The Disputes Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey of Court and
Administrative Decisions, 25 FORDEAm L. REv. 11-13 (1956).
12. Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
13. Id. at 402. See also Sweeney v. United States, 109 U.S. 618, 620 (1883) ; Merrill-
Ruckgaber Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 387, 393 (1916); Plumley v. United States,
226 U.S. 545, 547 (1913).
14. The Court established the "duty that the agent's judgment should be exercised -
not capriciously or fraudulently, but reasonably and with due regard to the rights of both
the contracting parties." Ripley v. United States, 223 U.S. 695, 701-02 (1912). For other
Supreme Court decisions where a more liberal standard than Kihlberg was applied, see,
e.g., Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 550, 564, 89 F. Supp. 545,
547-48, aff'd per curian by divided court, 340 U.S. 898 (1950).
15. See Needles v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 535 (1944).
[T]he court may review an administrative decision when all the substantial
evidence and relevant data known to the officer and normally considered in arriv-
ing at such a decision are against it. Under such facts the decision would be so
grossly erroneous as to justify the inference of bias or bad faith.
Id. at 604.
See also Bein v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 144, 167 (1943). One commentator has
suggested that "one gets the feeling that the court in most cases looked more to the
rational basis for the government official's finding of fact than [to the Supreme Court
sanctioned tests]. ' Note, United States v. Bianchi - The Wunderlich Cycle Again?, 32
GEO. WAsH. L. Rav. 118, 120 (1963). As will be seen, at the time the Court of Claims
initiated these standards, contract board procedures were often subpar. E.g., they were
not adversary proceedings in which the government presented all of its witnesses. If the
Court of Claims had not pierced the veil of finality, injustices to the contractor might
have gone unrevealed. See, e.g., Penker Constr. Co. v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 1 (1942).
See also Braucher, supra note 3, at 494-99.
16. 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1958).
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historical justifications for finality weighed heavily; but on the other, there
was some recognition that under contemporary circumstances the government
was no ordinary private party and that the contractor did not really have the
power to bargain over the question of whether the government should be
arbitrator.
17
The unsatisfactory nature of a system of final contracting officer decisions
and judicial review limited by the finality doctrine became plainly evident
during the First World War, when the pressures of government procurement
resulted in a greatly increased number of disputes and in general dissatisfac-
tion by both contractors and executive department officials with the decisions
reached by contracting officers. In response to this, some executive depart-
ments - without legislative assistance - developed internal machinery for
what originally was conceived of as "appellate" review of contracting officers.' 8
Thus, in current standard government contracts, the same clause which pro-
vides for finality also provides that:
the decision of the contracting officer shall be final and conclusive unless
within 30 days from the date of receipt of [the written decision of the
contracting officer] the contractor ... furnishes to the contracting officer
a written appeal addressed to the head of the agency involved. The deci-
sion of the head of the department or his duly authorized representative
for the determination of such appeals shall be final and conclusive.' 9
In most departments the job of reviewing contract officer decision was dele-
gated to a "contract board," and their review has taken on the nature of a
de novo trial ;20 despite the increased importance of the contract boards, Con-
gress, prior to 1954, had made no effort to control their growth or regulate
their procedures.
A distinction may be made between the jurisdiction of the contract boards
and the finality which is afforded their decision by the courts. The scope of
finality has been statutorily defined and judicially construed so that it is de-
pendent upon the uncertainties of the law-fact distinction. Contract board
determinations on "questions of fact" may not be upset in the courts unless
arbitrary or capricious procedures or lack of substantial evidence are shown.
Board determinations of "questions of law," however, are afforded no finality.
17. For a discussion of the government's position vis-a-vis the private contractor at
the time of the remedial Wunderlich Act, see Schultz, Proposed Changes in Government
Contract Disputes Settlement: The Legislative Battle Over the Wunderlich Case, 67
HARv. L. REv. 217, 219-22, 227-28 (1953).
18. See Shedd, supra note 3, at 42-56, for a detailed historical presentation of the
events leading up to the formation of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA). While the history of contract boards representing the heads of departments
stretches back to the Civil War - see United States v. Adams, 74 U.S. 463 (1868), and
final appellate decision by department heads was upheld in 1913 in Plumley v. United
States, 226 U.S. 545 (1913) - no formal mechanisms were established until World War
I. The roots of the present ASBCA lie in boards set up during World War II.
19. 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A, cl. 6 (1964).
20. See Shedd, supra note 3, at 69-71.
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The jurisdiction of the contract boards also hinges, theoretically, on the
law-fact dichotomy. If a particular dispute is characterized as a "pure" ques-
tion of law, the contract board normally declines to hear the case. On the
other hand, disputes labeled questions of fact or mixed law and fact are
originally cognizable by the boards.2' It is for this reason that a distinction
is drawn between a breach of contract case which may be brought originally
before a court and disputes arising under a contract clause, such as an adjust-
ment clause, which must be appealed to the contract board. The former are
viewed as presenting only questions of law, the latter as also involving factual
issues.22 If, for example, a construction contractor discovers a subsoil con-
dition which he did not anticipate or the government finds it does not need
what it has ordered and wishes to terminate a contract for its convenience, a
contractor aggrieved by the compensation determination of a contracting offi-
cer must go to the contract board because his grievance is covered by the
standard contract adjustment clause in his contract.2 The contract boards are
21. For a general discussion of the problem, see Birnbaum, Questions of Laz' and
Fact and the Jurisdiction of the Arimed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 19 FED. B.J.
120 (1959). The ASBCA's charter provides:
[W]hen an appeal is taken pursuant to a disputes clause in a contract which
limits appeals to disputes concerning questions of fact, the Board may in its dis-
cretion hear, consider, and decide all questions of law necessary for the complete
adjudication of the issue.
32 C.F.R. § 30.1, Part II, (I) (b) (Supp. 1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 9348 (1963).
When a claim is made that is not cognizable by the Board under the contract's terms, the
Board may make findings of fact without expressing an opinion on the question of lia-
bility. Ibid. See, e.g., S. Rosenthal & Son, Inc., 61-2 B.C.A. 16,361 (1961) (breach of con-
tract) ; Murray-Sanders & Associates, 61-1 B.C.A. 15,493 (1961) (equitable adjust-
ment) ; Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Unitdd States, 116 Ct. Cl. 849 (1949), 84 F. Supp. 589
(1949) (rescission or reformation. of contract). The Board has dismissed appeals after
determining it has no authority to grant relief and no useful purpose would be served by
a hearing on the merits. Simmel-Industrie Meccaniche Societa per Azioni, 61-1 B.C.A.
15,229 (1961). See generally Joy, supra note 11, at 29-45.
22. There is, however, difference of opinion between the boards and courts as to what
constitutes "breach of contract." Compare Spector, supra note 7, at 10 n.23, and Shedd,
supra note 3, at 74-75, with Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 603, 629-30
(1937) ; Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 723 (1959) ; Saddler v. United
States, 287 F.2d 411 (Ct. Cl. 1961). But cf. Cannon Constr. Co. v. United States, 319
F.2d 173 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
23. See generally vom Baur, Claims Under a Government Contract and Those for
Breach of It, 2 Gov. CONT. REv. 5 (May 1958). See also McCord v. United States, 9 Ct.
Cl. 155 (1873), aff'd sub nomn. Chanteau v. United States, 95 U.S. 61 (1877), for an e.x-
ample of how the breach of contract suit under a contract distinction was applied in the
days of the first ironclad battleships. The case illustrates a modem problem which con-
tract clauses were designed to deal with - disputes arising out of an agreement to create
something whose precise characteristics, cost, and "sticky points" cannot, by virtue of the
newness of the thing to be created, be anticipated at the time of contracting. But for the
existence of adjustment clauses, the occurrence of "contract breaches" would be unavoid-
able. The ASBCA observes the distinction between contract breach and adjustment under
these clauses. See, e.g., Bonaco Constr. Co., 61-1 B.C.A. 15,228 (1961) ; Donald M. Drake
Co., 57-2 B.C.A. 4,533 (1957). The ASBCA does not grant relief for damages for breach
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thus concerned, in practice, with whether a particular dispute is covered by a
contract provision in which obligations and rights are fixed and in which
liquidated damages may be awarded.24 Contract boards will, however, deter-
mine all of the issues in a case, including questions of law, so long as the case
arises under the contract. 25 This is in keeping with the disputes clause, which
informs the contractor that although its terms speak of finality only on ques-
tions of fact, it "does not preclude consideration of questions of law in con-
nection with decisions provided for in [the finality of fact dispute determina-
tion] paragraph. '26 Boards could not do otherwise; the jurisdiction typically
marked out by the executive department requires a board to handle disputes
in their entirety, in such a way as to entail no extradepartmental litigation.
One consequence of this law-fact distinction has been to create doubt as to
when a contractor must exhaust the departmental remedies afforded him. If a
contractor fails to appeal to the contract board, in most cases he is barred
from suit against the United States in federal court. But in instances where a
"pure" question of law is at issue, contractors may go directly to court, without
first exhausting departmental remedies. In practice most contractors do appeal
to the contract boards, perhaps because a wrong guess as to whether their
dispute presents a "pure" question of law may effectively foreclose all review.27
of contract. See, e.g., Roscoe Eng'r Corp., 61-2 B.C.A. 16,356 (1961). Nor is the Board
authorized to grant extra-contractual relief. See, e.g., Keflavic Contractors, 61-2 B.C.A.
16,431 (1961). Some ASBCA members have questioned the continuing validity of these
policies. Shedd, Administrative Authority to Settle Claims for Breach of Government
Contracts, 27 Gzo. WASH. L. Rxv. 481 (1959). This position has also been strongly urged
by the Department of Justice. Brief for Appellee, pp. 21-24, Silverman Bros. v. United
States, 324 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1963).
24. This point is strongly emphasized and documented in Birnbaum, Questions of
Law and Fact and the Jurisdiction of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 19
FED. B.J. 120 (1959).
25. There is some question as to how this principle should be applied when a question
arises over what standards of performance the contract requires - i.e., problems of con-
tract interpretation and construction. While courts have generally treated such questions
as ones of law - see, e.g., Kayfield Constr. Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1960) - the ASBCA classifies contract interpretation disputes as "mixed" questions of
law and fact, has heard timely appeals on these matters - e.g., Rogers Constr. Co., 58-1
B.C.A. 6172 (1958) - and has granted adjustment relief in cases where the contract
officer's interpretation of an ambiguous document was no more reasonable than those of
the contractor - e.g., Keco Industries, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. 17,627. Compare the Court of
Claims position as expressed in WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874,
878 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Bell Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 398, 100 F. Supp.
661 (1959), aff'd by equally divided court, 344 U.S. 860 (1952).
26. 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A, cl. 6 (1964). See, e.g., Edward Iron- Works, Inc., 56-2
B.C.A. 2018 (1956).
27. See United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1946). Accord,
United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944) ; United States v. Callahan Walker Constr.
Co., 317 U.S. 56 (1942). See Happel v. United States, 279 F.2d 88, 91 (8th Cir. 1960) ;
Henry E. Wile Co. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 394, 399, 169 F. Supp. 249, 252 (1959).
See also Spector, "Law" is Where you Find It, or "Fact" is in the Eyes of the Be-
holder, 19 FED. B.J. 212 (1959), where the handling of this case and another by the Court
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The volume of cases falling under contract board jurisdiction has grown
significantly over the years, not only because of the increased number of
government contracts, but also because of the way in which the standard
form contracts have been drafted. The value to government departments of
that portion of the disputes clause which provides that:
Pending final decision of a dispute, the Contractor shall proceed diligently
with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Con-
tracting Officer's decision.
28
has led to the proliferation of such clauses in procurement contracts. Provisions
for continuing price determinations and cost computation in cost-plus-fixed-
fee contracts have been developed to bring additional cases within contract
board jurisdiction.
29
Other developments in the manner in which procurement is conducted,
moreover, have tended to cut down the extent to which disputes are adjudi-
cated outside executive departments. The great dollar volume of defense
contracts are "negotiated," not "advertised"; rather than holding competitive
bidding, the government seeks out those few firms capable of meeting its
needs, and confers the contract on the best price-product package offered.
Such contracts are the basis of a continuing relationship between government
and contractor, during which government needs or other circumstances may
change. Hence, there is express or tacit recognition that the details will be
worked out as the project evolves. Through such contracts the government
of Claims is criticized. See generally Speidel, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
in Government Contracts, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 621, 625-26 (1963), who derives the basis of
the law-fact distinction in the "exhaustion" context from the fact that in Holpuch an "all
disputes" rather than a fact-limited disputes clause was involved. He takes a pragmatic
approach to the contractor's problem:
The duty to exhaust depends neither upon the manipulation of the law-fact dis-
tinction nor court treatment of board decisions, but whether, in any given dispute,
the cognizant board of contract appeals has power under its charter and the con-
tract to make a decision which, if acquiesced in by the contractor, will settle the
dispute for all practical purposes.
Id. at 632.
28. 41 C.F.R. § 1-16.901-23A, cl. 6 (1964). See Hearings Before the Special Investi-
gation, Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
794-95 [hereinafter cited as Hebert Hearings].
29. See Bragdon, Administrative Resolution of Delay Claims in Government Con-
tracts, 14 AD. L. BULL. 8, 13 (1961) ; Shedd, Administrative Authority to Settle Claims
for Breach of Government Contracts, 27 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 481, 515-16 (1959). See
also G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert.
denied, 32 U.S.L. WEER 3220 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1963), rehearing denied, 32 U.S.L. WEER,
3291 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1964), which is commented upon in Cibinic, Contract by Regulation,
32 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 111 (1963). Christian suggested that if the regulations (ASPRs)
had required a contract to include an adjustment clause, the contractor was bound to that
clause even though it did not appear in the contract which he had signed. It has been
suggested, however, that Christian may not have the broad impact which a literal reading
of it implies. Interview with Professor Ralph Nash of The George Washington Univer-
sity in Washington, D.C., June 4, 1964 (hereinafter cited as Nash Interview).
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benefits from corporate flexibility and know-how without having to assume
a business function itself. Such contracts represent an alternative to standard
form or "control" contracts, which are supplemented by the unilateral issuance
of government regulations. When difficulties do arise under negotiated con-
tracts, they are usually handled by contract boards. Although negotiated con-
tracts usually provide that costs be automatically reimbursed, and although
few difficulties are presently encountered, it has been suggested that disputes
growing out of negotiated contracts may increase within the next few years.30
Thus, from the simple idea of a contract clause delegating authority for
final payment to a government representative in a position to observe easily
whether the contract's terms had been fulfilled, an institutional system for
the resolution of almost all contract disputes has grown. Contracting officers,
executive department bodies, and courts (notably the Court of Claims) are
the participants in this system.
The two adversaries who make use of this system - the contractor and
the particular executive department - are each motivated by multiple in-
terests. While the contractor and the executive department probably agree
that the decision making process should remain rapid and inexpensive, their
respective concerns tend to diverge beyond this point. Executive agencies
wish to keep contractors at work during disputes. Further, they want to
keep the settlement of disputes confined to their own departmental machinery
as far as possible, so that uniform contract interpretations can be developed.
Such uniformity presumably makes possible department reliance upon standard
clauses to cover dispute contingencies. It is also in departmental interest to
develop machinery to oversee the work of both the contractors and the con-
tracting officers, making it possible to enforce more uniform standards of
job performance and job administration. And, of course, the executive de-
partments want to keep down the costs of contract performance.
The interests of contractors are initially shaped by the fact that they are
linked by adhesionary contracts to the contracting officer-contract board
30. For definition of when negotiated contracts are entered into, see Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947, 62 Stat. 21, 22, 24 (1948), 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1958), and the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 66 Stat. 594 (1949), 41 U.S.C.
§ 252(c), 254 (1958).
There is some indication, however, that, as a policy matter, fewer negotiated contracts
are entered into. This result is achieved in the defense area by dividing new weapons
into component parts so that competitive bids can be sought on each part. Duscha, The
Costly Mysteries of Defense Spending, Harper's Magazine, April, 1964, pp. 59, 63. See
also Lazure, Why Research and Development Contracts are Distinctive, 17 FED. B.J. 255
(1957) ; Cuneo, Research and Development Problem Areas as Reflected in Board of Con-
tract Appeals Cases, 17 FED. B.J. 386 (1957). The Nash Interview suggested the monetary
importance of negotiated contracts and the possibility that a greater number of disputes
will arise out of them in the future than have in the past. One possible reason for this is
the policy decision, at least in the Defense Department, to shift away from cost-plus-
fixed-fee contracts to incentive contracts which reward efficiency and penalize shoddy or
tardy work. See Wall Street Journal, June 11, 1964, col. 6.
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system of resolving disputes. Although some of the larger contractors, through
associations, may have helped to shape a standard clause when it was origi-
nally drafted or later modified, they will have had no opportunity to bargain
over its insertion in any particular contract, and they will be bound by the
terms of the clause in any given case to the same extent as a small contractor. 31
Even if disputes are less frequent under negotiated contracts or if a large
contractor has available greater means of procuring a favorable settlement
with the contracting officer,32 when a dispute does arise the large contractor's
interest in the machinery by which resolution is effected would seem identical
to that of the small contractor.
The first interest of contractors is to secure a fair hearing with the con-
tracting officer. To this end a right of appeal is necessary in order to deter
the contracting officer from arbitrary decisions and to provide a remedy for
improper decisions. A second related concern is that the forum for appeal be
one in which due process can be had - especially one where both parties
must present all evidence relied upon for decision and opportunity for re-
buttal exists. Finally, contractors have an interest in the existence of judicial
review outside of the contracting department itself to remedy unsatisfactory
contract board procedures and incorrect holdings. Underlying all of these
concerns, of course, is the survival interest motivating all contractors: pre-
serving their profit margin.
This Comment will examine the interaction of the parties concerned with
contract disputes - the adversary participants, the contract boards, the fed-
eral courts, the Department of Justice, and the General Accounting Office -
and attempt to evaluate the relative importance of the factors which have
been primarily responsible for the shaping of the current contract dispute
machinery and law. First, the nature and shortcomings of the currently par-
ticipating institutions will be examined; the recent development of their inter-
relationships will be analyzed; and finally, possible solutions to the problem
of how government contract disputes may be resolved will be evaluated. In
conducting this analysis, several themes will reappear. The existing mechanism
for resolution of contract disputes is largely the product of unplanned growth;
as specific problems have arisen the various institutions have reacted in an
31. See Pasley, The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A Plea for Better
Understanding, 25 FORDHAmX L. Rnv. 211, 213-14 (1956). While conceding that govern-
ment contracts are ones of adhesion, this commentator points out that they are negotiated
over time by representatives of various trade associations and organizations such as the
N.A.M.
32. It has been scathingly suggested that the main harmful effects of the way in
which the process of procurement and procurement disputes administration is conducted
falls upon small businessmen whose whole livelihood is dependent on government con-
tracts. See Lidstone & Witte, Administration of Government Contracts, 46 VA. L. REv.
252, 252-56 (1960). One explanation for this uneven impact may be that it is small con-
tractors who "sharpen their pencils" when making their bids, hoping to make a profit on
"extras" acquired from the government in the course of the transaction, who must litigate
to protect their profit margin. Lidstone & Witte, spra at 255. Nash Interview.
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ad hoc manner, seeking rectification only of the immediate shortcomings of
the system. No overall systematic. solution has been sought. The concern of
the participants with their own institutional prerogatives has exacerbated
the problems arising from this ad hoc development. Finally, the institutions
involved typically have attempted to solve new problems as they arise by ref-
erence to other bodies of law, even though the analogies drawn may not have
been wholly appropriate. Thus, the contract boards have often justified their
role by reference to commercial law; the Supreme Court has appealed to ad-
ministrative law as a model for the relationships between the contract boards
and the Court of Claims; and the Court of Claims has protected its position
by manipulating the law-fact distinction which was originally developed in the
judge-jury context. It will be argued that rather than seeking to preserve a
delicate balance of prerogatives between the interested institutions, it would
be more desirable to examine their respective capabilities and to synthesize
these capabilities into a mechanism designed to be more sensitive to all in-
terests than is the present one.
II. THE INSTITUTIONS
A. Intra-Departmental Dispute Resolution
At present, some fourteen contract boards have been set up by executive
departments and agencies.3 3 The most important of these, in terms of case-
load and dollar volume handled, is the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA). As government spending patterns shift, it is quite pos-
sible that other contract boards will become of importance ;84 but the present
preeminence of the ASBCA justifies centering attention upon it. Military
contract appeal boards have the longest history of continuous operation,3 5 and
33. See generally Ablard, A Survey of the Boards of Contract Appeal in the Federal
Government and Their Authority to Decide Contract Disputes, 30 J.B.A.D.C. 64 (1963) ;
Caruso, The Federal Boards of Contract Appeals, 33 So. CA.. L. REv. 403 (1960). The
rules of the contract boards are published in, the Code of Federal Regulations. The most
important boards in terms of dollar volume of disputes are, as disclosed in the Nash In-
terview: Department of Defense, ASBCA (Rules of Practice), 32 C.F.R. § 30.1 (Supp.
1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 9348-51 (1963); Army Corps of Engineers, Board of
Contract Appeals (Rules of Practice), 33 C.F.R. § 210.4 (1962); Department of the
Interior, Board of Contract Appeals (Rules of Practice), 43 C.F.R. § 4.1-16 (Supp. 1963).
Post Office Department, Board of Contract Appeals (Rules of Practice), 39 C.F.R. §§
201.101-121 (1962); General Services Administration, Board of Contract Appeals (Rules
of Practice), 41 C.F.R. §§ 5-60.2-60.222 (1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 1770, 28 Fed.
Reg. 11682 (1963) ; Veterans' Administration, Contract Appeals Board (Rules of Prac-
tice), 38 C.F.R. §§ 1.770-.775 (1964). The Department of Commerce, Board of Con-
tract Appeals operates without formal rules. Because of the flexibility of procedure which
the rules provide for, mere verbal and structural similarities do not imply similar prac-
tice. For a complete list of contract boards rules of practice, and discussion of disputes
procedure of agencies which do not have formal contract boards, see Miller, Adminis-
trative Determination and Judicial Review of Contract Appeals, 5 Bosrol COLLEGE IND.
& Com. L. REv. 111, 116-18 (1963).
34. Spector Interview; Nash Interview.
35. See Shedd, mipra note 3, at 44-63.
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the ASBCA has developed procedural safeguards of a rather high level of
sophistication. 36 These procedures have in fact served as models for many
departmental contract boards.37 Although some contract boards observe less
stringent procedural standards, the ASBCA presents a good example of the
fair procedures executive departments can provide for contractors.
1. Contracting Officers
The relationship of the contracting officer to the contractor will necessarily
depend, to a certain extent, upon the nature of the contract review machinery
which his executive department has created. For example, the extent and
manner in which his decision will be reviewed within the department will
undoubtedly influence his methods of administering the contract. Under any
system of review, however, he is the person designated to oversee the day-
to-day operation of the contract; all disputes involving the contract are ini-
tially considered by him. Under the authority vested by the contract's finality
clause, the contracting officer makes a decision as to what contract adjustment
should be made. In many instances the contracting officer is really something
of an "institution," supported by an office in which technical and legal advice
is available. He is in a position to consult both with the contractor and the
contractor's technical advisors and consultants and to reach a mutually agree-
able solution.38 But contracting officers are in no sense impartial fact-finders
analogous to or held to the standards of Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
trial examiners. In the Defense Department context, they are often military
personnel charged with upholding the government's interest. It is difficult to
see how the contracting officer can vigorously and fairly fulfill both his role as
"manager" of the contract, in which he must keep government costs down,
and his role as umpire of disputes, in which he is envisaged as an impartial
arbiter. Despite the theoretical unfairness to the contractor implicit in the
officer's dual role, many contract disputes are, in practice, satisfactorily settled
at the contracting officer's level.39 Where no settlement is reached, the con-
36. Able and ardent advocacy of the ASBCA may be found in Spector, Is It
"Bianchi's Ghost" - or "Much Ado About Nothing"?, 29 LAw & CONTEUP. PROB. 87,
97-102 (1964) ; Spector, supra note 4; Cuneo, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals:
Tyrant or Impartial Tribunal, 39 A.B.A.J. 373 (1953). But compare the equally ardent
Lidstone & Witte, supra note 32.
37. Miller, supra note 38, at 118.
38. Interview with Saul R. Gamer, Commissioner of Court of Claims, in Washington,
D.C., June 2, 1964 [hereinafter cited as Gamer Interview]. For the Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulations (ASPR) definition of the contracting officer and his functions, see
32 C.F.R. §§ 1.201-3, 1A01-.404, 3.801-2(2) (1961). See generally Schultz, supra note 17,
at 224 n.27; CUNEO, op. cit. supra note 3, at 189-90, 252 (1962) ; McIntire, Authority of
Government Contracting Officers: Estoppel and Apparent Authority, 25 GEO. WAsH. L.
Rxv. 162 (1957).
39. See Schultz, supra note 17, at 224.
It may be that the contracting officer differentiates between his responsibilities toward
large firms, with well-paid experienced counsel and smaller firms which are less familiar
with the intricacies of procurement law. Toward the former, his role may be more strictly
that of representative of a "private party" than toward the latter. Nash Interview.
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tracting officer's adjustment of the contract dispute may be appealed by the
contractor to the ASBCA; absent appeal, the officer's decision is final. 40 Upon
appeal to the ASBCA there is no presumption of validity attached to the
contracting officer's decision.
41
2. The Contract Boards
The ASBCA has been characterized by its chairman as "monolithically
quasi-judicial"; its similarity to the independent administrative agencies,
which often adjudicate the disputes of private parties, has thus been stressed.
The ASBCA, moreover, operates with a relative degree of flexibility, speed,
and inexpensiveness - the characteristics often attributed to the administra-
tive process. Unlike administrative agencies, however, contract boards, the
ASBCA among them, have their legal basis in contract dispute clauses and
departmental authorization, rather than in congressional enabling acts. They
do not exist to "regulate" the activities of government contractors in accord-
ance with public policies established by Congress; ostensibly their only function
is to adjudicate contract disputes. 42 Further, since the contract boards are
non-statutory in origin, and since the board is comprised of employees of
the same department which is party to the dispute, contract board hearings
are not subject to the APA, which governs the hearings of the major adminis-
trative agencies.43 An added consequence of the boards' lack of formal sepa-
ration from their respective departments is that they are not insulated from out-
side pressures in the same manner as are the independent agencies. While the
ASBCA is known for its independence, one may wonder if the other boards
can avoid being influenced by the contract policies established by their respec-
40. 32 C.F.R. § 30.1, Part II (Supp. 1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 9348 (1963).
While most appeals are from the decisions of contracting officers, the ASBCA is author-
ized to hear appeals taken pursuant to the provisions of any directive whereby right
of appeal not contained in the contract has been granted by one of the secretaries. Id. at
§ 30.1 (I) (b).
41. Spector Interview.
42. Chairman Spector has asserted:
[T]he criticisms levelled against these agencies are not relevant [to the ASBCA].
Critics complain, for example, of the intermingling by regulatory agencies of
quasi-judicial functions with other functions which are basically executive in nature,
and the indiscriminate application of quasi-judicial techniques to both types of
functions. The function of resolving disputes [in the ASBCA], in contrast, is
monolithically quasi-judicial in nature and has been traditionally recognized as such.
Spector, supra note 4, at 400 n.10.
43. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1958)
[hereinafter cited as APA]. Under the terms of § 2(a) of the Act, the board would be
exempted from the "agency" label since it is a body composed of the representatives of
one of the parties to the disputes. Moreover, since the adjudication of disputes is required
by contract, not statute, it is not subject to the hearing requirements of § 5. U.S. DEr.
OF THE ARmY, PROCUREMENT LEGAL SERvicE 132 (Pamphlet No. 715-50-3, 1963). See
also G.A.O. B-152346, 32 U.S.L. WREY 2280 (Nov. 22, 1963).
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five executive departments." A final distinction between contract boards and
the independent agencies is their selection of hearing officers. Contract board
hearing officers vary greatly in status. Although ASBCA members also serve
as hearing examiners, in some boards hearing officers are drafted from offices
such as the department's general counsel's office without conferring on the
draftee any quasi-judicial status.
45
When an aggrieved contractor avails himself of his right to appeal to the
ASBCA, the contract officer is required to forward to the Board and the
government trial attorney all information and material which bears on the
dispute, whether or not it would be admissible in a court. The ASBCA then
usually assigns one of its members to hold hearings, examine witnesses, and
report back his findings to one of the board's "divisions," which is comprised
of three members, and which decides the case.40
The ASBCA has established a fairly elaborate procedural framework for
its hearings. Its procedures have been defended as flexible and fair; this very
flexibility presents a potential for abuse, though the ASBCA apparently has
so far succeeded in avoiding that pitfall.4 7 While in most aspects an ASBCA
hearing is quite similar to a civil trial without jury, the proceedings may be,
according to the ASBCA charter, "as informal as may be reasonable and
appropriate under the circumstances." The Board is empowered to disregard
the accepted rules of evidence if it chooses, and has complete discretion as to
what weight to attach to evidence. 48 Except in cases where the government
is seeking a refund of money, the contractor must always go forward with
the evidence.
49
Two serious criticisms have been leveled at the mechanics of the contract
board decision-maling process: first, that the "appeal file" relied upon by
44. Members of the ASBCA are jointly appointed by an Assistant Secretary of De-
fense and the assistant secretaries of the military departments responsible for procure-
ment, 32 C.F.R. § 30.1 (Supp. 1963). Contract board members are generally departmental
appointees. The suggestion has been made that the degree of independence exercised by a
contract board will be a function of the extent to which it operates full time and the
extent to which the impact of its decisions on contractors leads them in turn to bring
countervailing pressure to bear on the boards. This pressure would tend to counteract
intra-agency pressure to conform to departmental procurement policy. Note, United States
v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.: Finality Under the Disputes Clause, 39 N.Y.U.L. P.-v. 290, 316
(1964).
45. Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits on Judicial Review of Administra-
five Determination of Government Contract Disputes, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 115,
129 (1964).
46. The pertinent ASBCA rules of procedure may be found at 28 Fed. Reg. 9351
(1963). See ASBCA Rule 28. Good discussions suggesting the intermeshing of these rules
as they bear on the development of the appeal file and the board decision may be found
in Cuneo, Development of the Administrative Record, Gov't Contract Rev., Nov., 1957,
p. 4. Miller, supra note 33, at 118-22; and Spector, supra note 4, at 97-100.
47. Spector Interview.
48. ASBCA Rule 20,28 Fed. Reg. 9350 (1963).
49. Cuneo, supra note 46, at 17-19. See Bar-Ray Products, 57-2 B.C.A. 5209 (1957).
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board members for decision is incomplete; second, that "deciding officers"
within executive departments search out and consult other documents of
possible relevance, without regard to the presence or absence of the claimant, 50
although the ASBCA bars such procedures. 51 The ASBCA has made an effort,
moreover, to meet the former objection, by instituting a relatively sophisticated
technique for the development of the appeal file. In addition to the material
submitted by the contracting officer, an ASBCA appeal file contains the plead-
ings, pre- and post-hearing briefs, such depositions 52 and interrogatories as
are permitted, and records of pre-hearing conferences and the hearing itself.
Both the government lawyer and the contractor are notified when any material
is added to the file; the contractor is always free to inspect the record and
raise objections to the materiality of anything in it. 5 3 However, there are de-
ficiencies in the Board's machinery for building the appeal file. Unlike agencies
operating under the APA, the ASBCA lacks an effective subpoena power
or power to compel production of documents. It has, moreover, no statutory
power to place a witness under oath - though it may inform him of the crimi-
nal consequences of lying in a suit involving claims against the United States. 4
Further, an ASBCA member is not required to afford parties the opportunity
to submit proposed findings and conclusion or exceptions to a recommended
decision.m5 Nor does the ASBCA charter guarantee, as does the APA, that
the testimony and exhibits will constitute the exclusive record for decision.15
Some of these criticisms may not be of great importance. Practically all wit-
nesses will be accessible either to the government or to the contractor, so that
the Board's lack of subpoena power is of less importance than it might seem.57
An old United States Code provision 58 has recently been dredged up and
pressed into service to provide other witnesses where necessary, 50 and there
50. Judge Mfadden of the Court of Claims seriously questioned the reliability of the
appeal file in Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp. 952
(1956). The decision is severely criticized in Cuneo, Judicial Review Under the Wunder-
lich Act; Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 17 FED. B.J. 626 (1957).
51. See Cuneo, supra note 46, at 4, 19.
52. Depositions are not taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Nor are depositions an instrument of pre-trial discovery. Board
rules permit only the discovery of designated documents; and (unlike FED. R. Civ. P. 34)
this rule is applied to prevent "fishing expeditions." ASBCA Rules 14, 15, 28 Fed. Reg.
9350 (1963). The scope of discovery is limited in other contract boards. See also Schultz,
supra note 45, at 128 n.59.
53. See note 46 supra.
54. The Board's exemption from the APA is discussed in note 43 supra.
55. Cf. APA § 8(b).
56. APA § 7(d).
57. Spector Interview.
58. Rev. Stat. § 184 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 94 (1958). Interview with David Rose, De-
partment of Justice, Civil Division, in Washington, D.C., June 2, 1964 (hereinafter desig-
nated Rose Interview].
59. A subpoena ad testificandum has been issued in one case (Appeal of Merritt-
Chapman & Scott, Inc., Department of Interior Board, of Contract Appeals No. 365),
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are sufficient penalties for lying on the witness stand to render relatively in-
nocuous the lack of power to place under oath. 60
The ASBCA does afford contractors at least minimum relief from the
potentially arbitrary actions of contracting officers. In the ASBCA, contrac-
tors are provided with a forum which has experience and technical knowledge
and in which they can confront all government witnesses. Furthermore, the
ASBCA commands the respect of the contract officers. Its decisions provide
the officers with legal guidance, and its very presence serves as a ready and
visible check on unfair or arbitrary practices. Clearly, the ASBCA, from the
contractor's viewpoint is preferable to ex parte determinations by department
officers; it is valuable from an administrative standpoint to department heads,
who are insulated by the boards from clamoring contractors. Board procedures
also provide for speedier and more economical resolution of disputes than is
available in the Court of Claims. Finally, the Court of Claims has been saved
from inundation by litigation resulting from the vastly increased government
procurement program. 61 It seems clear that most of these advantages are de-
pendent on the existence of the finality of Board decisions; absent finality
the ASBCA would become a mere stop on route to court appeal, and its de-
cisions would have no binding effect. One of the ASBCA's chief interests thus
appears to be the prevention of tampering with the finality doctrine.
2
In sum, the example of the ASBCA suggests that it is possible to establish
machinery which, though both non-judicial and outside the APA, can accom-
plish a great deal of what contractors demand and government procurement
administration requires. It seems evident, though, that the standards main-
tained by contract boards depend a great deal on the amount of authority
conferred upon them by the departments and agencies and on the caliber of
men the departments choose to assign to the boards. This problem is intensi-
fied by the institutional framework of the boards. The whole process of dispute
resolution occurs within a single executive department in which effective
insulation and impartiality is difficult. The boards are not charged with
maintaining an elaborate statutory scheme; their charters are their authorizing
and a subpoena duces tecum has been issued in another (Appeal of Merritt-Chapman &
Scott, Inc., ASBCA No. 8293) (these were separate cases involving the same company).
See Miller, supra note 33, at 125 n.92. In agreeing to procure the latter subpoenas, the
Justice Department successfully sought agreement that the right to use this mechanism
would be extended by department heads to private litigants. Rose Interview.
60. As a subsitute for an oath, board members read to each witness as he takes the
stand the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1958), or the False Statement Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
61. Spector, Anatomy of a Dispute, 20 FED. B.J. 398 (1960).
62. Id. at 406. See Spector, Is It "Bianchi's Ghost" - or "Much Ado About
Nothing"?, 29 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROB. 87, 102-07 (1964), where emphasis is placed upon
the mere "residue of finality" of ASBCA decisions and upon its "limited" formal scope,
narrowed not only by statute, but by the "continuing struggle between the Court of Claims
and the Supreme Court."
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statutes, but they draw their own charters.6 3 This paradoxical position of
contract boards, heightened by the way in which the law-fact distinction im-
pinges upon board jurisdiction and upon the finality of board decisions, has
made judicial review even more an instance of tortured line drawing than is
review of the independent administrative agency.
B. The Court of Claims
Two forums for review of contract board decisions are available. All gov-
ernment actions against contractors must be brought in federal district courts.64
The district courts and the Court of Claims have concurrent jurisdiction over
contractor appeals involving claims for less than $10,000. The Court of Claims
has exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals involving more than $10,000. 65
Since friction has arisen primarily from Court of Claims decisions, and since
a relatively large number of appeals seem to involve more than $10,000, this
analysis of appellate review of contract board decisions will focus exclusively
on the Court of Claims.
The Court of Claims 66 was originally established in response to problems
similar to those which led to the creation of contract boards - the need for
an institution which could give effective trial-type hearings to aggrieved con-
tractors. 67 The most distinctive characteristic of the Court of Claims is the
commissioner system, which was devised after the court was engulfed by the
wave of procurement litigation which followed World War I. Originally,
seven attorneys were appointed to handle hearings and make rulings on evi-
dentiary points. Over the years, the role of the commissioners was expanded,
so that in many respects they are now analogous to federal district judges
sitting without juries or, to some extent, APA hearing examiners. Commis-
sioners are formally permitted to "exercise the power to regulate all proceed-
ings and do all acts necessary for the efficient performance of their duties."
A commissioner is authorized, for example, to have the attorneys appear
before him in order to clarify issues and simplify pleadings and to consider
the possibility of avoiding unnecessary proof; he may hold a pre-trial confer-
ence. The commissioner then holds a trial, at which provisions similar to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in force. The decisions of the commis-
sioners, however, are not final. At the trial's close, the commissioner prepares
63. Spector Interview.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1958).
65. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2), 1491 (1958). When the contractor consents to the dis-
putes procedure, he does not promise to settle any dispute by agreement with the con-
tracting officer or board.
66. For general discussion of the types of cases handled by the Court of Claims, and
the manner in which it handles them, see Wilkinson, The Court of Claims: Where Uncle
Sam is Always the Defendant, 36 A.B.A.J. 89 (1950). See also Brenner, Judicial Review
by Money Judgment in the Court of. Claims, 21 FED. B.J. 179 (1961) ; Hoyt, Legislative
History, 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF CLMAms DIGEST XIII-XXXVI (1950).
67. For general discussion of the origins of the Court of Claims and its evolution into
its present form see Evans, The United States Court of Claims, 17 FED. B.J. 85 (1957).
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a report to the court on his findings of fact, which bears a presumption of
correctness in the Court of Claims itself. When directed by the court, the
commissioner may also submit recommendations for conclusions of law. In
the absence of exceptions by the parties, such recommendations are adopted
as conclusions of law by the Court of Claims, and judgment is entered upon
them. In effect, the commissioner writes a tentative opinion which the court's
judges rely upon or adopt. The five judges, sitting en banc, hear oral argument
and prepare a written decision.6 8 Certiorari may be had to the Supreme Court
by either party to the suit.
The Court of Claims is, effectively, a bifurcated body. The judges origi-
nally intended by Congress to be trial judges are now more like appellate
judges sitting on all cases decided by the commissioners.6 9 In those breach
of contract cases which are originally brought in the court, the commissioner's
role as a fact-finder is a meaningful one since a contract board has not heard
the case or made findings of fact. But it remains unclear how the Court of
Claims ought to act in cases where a contract board has already found the
facts. Judicial review of administrative agencies is, of course, appellate in
practically all instances; judicial review of contract boards by commissioners
playing their traditional role is, however, de novo trial review.
70
Although a variety of legislative and judicial guidelines have been laid
down in the past decade, the Court of Claims has fastened upon the law-fact
dichotomy as a rationale for allowing its commissioner to conduct a de novo
hearing in a great number of cases already heard by contract boards. Thus
the Court of Claims has tended to construe finality clauses narrowly, to
broaden the definition of a breach of contract case, and to define generously
the term "question of law." The result has been to create more questions of
law over which the Court of Claims has the right to conduct de novo hearings.
71
In a related line of cases, the Court of Claims attempted to broaden the scope
and standards of review over the final "fact" determinations reached by con-
68. See Gamer, Some Notes on Court of Clains Practice, Gov't Contract Rev.,
April, 1958, p. 4; Evans, supra note 67.
69. Commentators' views toward the functional role of the Court of Claims have
changed, in the light of legislation and judicial decisions. Compare Schultz, Proposed
Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement: The Legislative Battle over the
Wunderlich Case, 67 HAv. L. REv. 217, 238 (1953), with Schultz, supra note 52, at 134.
70. See 4 DAvis, ADMNISTRATIV LAW §§ 7.10, 29.09 (1958).
71. Ad hoc accommodation to legislative and judicial guidelines has produced the
ways in which the Court of Claims preserves its jurisdiction. See, e.g., pre-Wunderlich
Act: Southern Shipyard Corp. v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 468 (1932); John. McShain,
Inc. v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 284 (1939), rev'd, 308 U.S. 512 (1939), modified, 308
U.S. 520 (1939) ; Callahan Walker Constr. Co. v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 314, rev'd,
317 U.S. 56 (1942) ; Beuttas v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 771 (Ct. Cl. 1944), rcv'd on
other grounds, 324 U.S. 768 (1945); post-Wunderlich Act: Railroad Waterproofing
Corp. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 911 (1956); Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 138
Ct. Cl. 571, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1957); P.L. Saddler v. United States, 152 Ct.
C1. 557 (1961).
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tract boards. These precedents served not only to provide contractors with a
ready forum for appeal from allegedly final decisions, but for a long while en-
abled the court to overturn board decisions on factual issues and to justify
readjudicating factual disputes with de novo hearings on all issues.72 The
court's behavior may have been due to a desire to do equity on the particular
facts of a case; it may have resulted from a scorn for contract board proce-
dures; or it may have been motivated by a concern for the preservation of its
own prerogatives.
73
Although many faults may be found with Court of Claim proceedings,
among them the three year wait necessary for a decision, and its proclivity
for conducting de novo hearings, the contractors, as a class, favor its retention
of current status. Under the present institutional set-up, the court is the only
source of judicial review for contractors with expensive claims, and it has
developed a certain amount of expertise. Of equal significance has been the
court's preservation of its independence and its willingness to find for con-
tractors in instances where the literal reading of Supreme Court holdings
might have precluded such results. For this reason, when judicial review by
the Court of Claims was effectively cut off, contractors rose in arms and
assured its restoration.7 4 Certainly, little merit can be seen in letting circuit
72. See notes 14 & 15 supra and accompanying text, discussing the development of
standards for the overturning of contract board fact findings. Concern with this trend was
voiced by the Justice Department's representative at the Wunderlich Act Hearings when
he was queried as to the value of the proposed standards of judicial review of contract
board fact findings. Hearings Before Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Finality Clauses
in Government Contracts, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Senate
W17underlich Hearigs].
73. An example of the Court of Claims' independence in interpretation of Supreme
Court rulings in the government contract area is its handling of the question of what
remedy a contractor should get for delays caused by the government. In general, it has
been kinder to the contractor than Supreme Court holdings might have led it to be. See,
e.g., Speck, Delays - Damages on Government Contracts: Constructive Conditions and
Administrative Remedies, 26 Gao. WAsE. L. REv. 505, 533-38 (1958) ; Seltzer & Cross,
Federal Government Construction Contracts: Liability for Delays Caused by the Govern-
ment, 25 FORnrHA L. RiEv. 423 (1956). The Volentine & Littleton Case, 144 Ct. Cl. 723
(1959), and notes 142-43 infra and accompanying text, illustrate the Court of Claims'
concern with substandard contract board proceedings.
Representatives of the Court of Claims and the ASBCA do not believe a conflict
exists between the two bodies. "Traditionally each [the ASBCA and the Court of Claims]
has its own sphere and each has respected the other's." Letter from Saul R. Garner,
Commissioner of the Court of Claims, to the Yale Law Journal, May 30, 1964, on file in
the Yale Law Library. "I would suggest that the Court of Claims could not exist in its
present form were it not for us. We, on the other hand, are staunch supporters of the
Court of Claims. We recognize that in the very few cases which go from our Board to
the Court, judicial review is an essential right." Letter from Louis Spector, Chairman,
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, to the Yale Law Journal, April 29, 1964, on
file in the Yale Law Library.
74. See, e.g., Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, Review of Finality Clauses in Government Contracts, 83d Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 3, 81 (1954) [hereinafter cited as House Wunderlich Hearings].
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courts take over the job of reviewing the contract boards; their dockets are
as crowded, and their expertise might be less. If a new sort of judicial review
is to supplant that of the Court of Claims, it should be developed afresh.
C. General Accounting Ofice
The General Accounting Office (GAO) was established under the terms of
the Budget & Accounting Act of 1921.7- It regards its function in the govern-
ment contracts area to be that which it exercises over the rest of the govern-
ment:
to examine and audit the financial transactions of the government and
settle and adjust all claims and accounts by and against the United States,
or in which the United States is concerned. 76
The GAO has asserted a right coextensive with that of the federal courts to
review contract board decisions, but it appears that it will generally review
only those cases not appealed to a court. 7 Hence, settlements and awards
made by contract boards to contractors may be set aside by the GAO in
situations where such decisions would not be accorded finality by a court.78
75. 42 Stat. 20 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). See generally Cable, The General
Accounting Office and Finality of Decisions of Government Contracting Offlcers, 27
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 780 (1952) ; Baer, The General Accounting Office: The Federal Govern-
nent's Auditor, 47 A.B.A.J. 359 (1961).
76. House Wunderlich Hearings 135.
77. After United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323 (1922), the GAO
limited the extent of its review to the same degree as did courts. See also Braucher,
Arbitration under Government Contracts, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 473, 489 n.116
(1952).
The Government may not directly re-open a controversy decidec4 unfavorably to it.
See Bell Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 398, 100 F. Supp. 661 (1951), aff'd
by equally divided Court, 344 U.S. 860 (1952). Government judicial relief from contract
board decisions is obtained in an indirect manner. The Comptroller General refuses to pay
the amount owing to the contractor by reason of a disputes decision. The suit brought by
the contractor based on his contract board decision is defended against under the terms
of the Wunderlich Act, permitting GAO review. See Joy, The Disputes Clause in Gov-
ernment Contracts: A Survey of Court and Administrative Decisions, 25 FORDHAm L.
REV. 11, 28-29 (1956).
For discussion of the instances in which the GAO will enter the dispute picture and
the kind of claims adjudicated by its Claims Division, see Schultz, Proposed Changes in
Government Contract Disputes Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv. 217, 230-33; Miller, supra
note 33, at 126-29. The relationship of the GAO to the contract boards can grow intricate.
GAO reversal of an ASBCA decision was upheld by the Court of Claims after a de novo
review of the evidence on the theory that a question of law was involved. Associated
Traders, Inc. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 744, 169 F. Supp. 502 (1959). For discussion
of the problem dealing with the competing interpretation, of the law of different forums,
engendered by GAO policy, see Lidstone & Witte, Administration of Government Con-
tracts: Disputes and Claims Procedures, 46 VA. L. REv. 252, 271-76, 286-89 (mistakes
in bids); Birnbaum, Government Contracts: The Role of the Comptroller General, 42
A.B.A.J. 433, 436, 488-92 (1956). Since United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S.
709 (1963), the GAO has abrogated the power to take de novo evidence, as have the
courts. See Schultz, supra note 45, at 133 n.86.
78. The GAO pressed for the Wunderlich legislation, which liberalized the standards
of judicial - and GAO - review of the contract boards. Its position was that the Wun-
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If the GAO's powers are those of a court, its procedures fall far short of
any judicial model. When there is a conflict between the assertion of the con-
tractor and the findings of the contracting officer, and a lack of evidence
sufficiently convincing to overcome a presumption of correctness, the GAO's
established rule is to accept as fact the report of the officer. The GAO has no
formal hearing procedure, and relies almost exclusively on written evidence ;79
yet it is jealous of its pretension of being a court. It recently reacted to a re-
lease foreclosing GAO review, executed after an important ASBCA decision,
by issuing a strongly worded directive to all executive agencies requiring any
future release or other contractual instrument entered into as a result of
appeal board decision to provide for GAO review under the congressionally
established tests applicable to courts.
80
The actual role of the GAO in the resolution of contract disputes has been
more of a potential threat than a daily reality. Contractors do not want review
in the GAO to become frequent, because they fear the reversal of successful
settlements and the effect which the possibility of such review will have on
their credit opportunities. Finality of contract board decisions, at least in
cases in which the departmental decision has satisfied them, is thus very im-
portant to contractors.
8 '
III. THrE WUNDERLICH CYCLE
Since 1950 there has been a cycle of judicial and legislative efforts at
allocating the phases of dispute resolution between the contract boards and
the Court of Claims. Both judicial decisions and legislation have been phrased
derlich decision, by requiring proof of actual fraud, made it virtually impossible for it to
fulfill its statutory duty of auditing government accounts. See Senate Wunderlich Hear-
ings 5 (letter from Lindsay C. Warren, Comptroller General). Despite contractor fears
that the GAO's powers of review would be expanded, see, e.g., House Wunderlich Hear-
ings 92, 93, the bill was passed. The House Report on the bill, H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) [hereinafter designated HousE WUNDERLICH REPoRT] asserts
that:
It is intended that the General Accounting Office, as was its practice, in re-
viewing a contract and change orders for the purpose of payment, shall apply the
standards of review that are granted to the courts under this bill.
Id. at 7. But it was immediately added that at the same time there was no intention of
setting up the GAO as a court of claims.
79. For thorough discussion of GAO procedures, see the articles cited in notes 75, 77
supra.
80. This directive, and the reaction of the Department of Defense to it, are discussed
in Spector, mspra note 36, at 112-13; Schultz, supra note 45, at 133 n.85.
81. This assertion is based both on the House W nderlich Hearings 92, 93, and on
the argument against extensive GAO review presented by Schultz, supra note 45, at 133.
See also Schultz testimony, House Wunderlich Hearings 109 (discussing the impact of
GAO review on contractors' credit) ; Spector, supra note 36, at 107-13 (the GAO and
importance of finality to contractors). But see, e.g., McClelland, Government Advocacy
as Related to Appeal Procedures Unaccomplished Since the Wunderlich Legislation, 25
FORD FAm L. REv. 593, 600-05 (1956).
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in terms of the law-fact distinction, largely because the standard disputes
clause, the source of contract board jurisdiction, has always explicitly con-
ferred finality only on departmental findings of fact. The issue has always
been one of the degree of finality to be accorded board decisions; however,
since the degree of finality defines the scope of review, jurisdictional overtones
have always characterized the cases. While generalization is hazardous, it may
fairly be said that, in the cases in which it has sought certiorari, the Depart-
ment of Justice has sought to promote the internal resolution of contract
disputes within executive departments, and correspondingly to narrow Court
of Claims de novo review because of its particularly upsetting effect on con-
tract board finality. The Court of Claims, on the other hand, has generally
sought to preserve for itself as broad an area of de novo review of contract
board decisions as possible. The Supreme Court, in the three recent major
cases in which it has construed finality clauses, has reversed the Court of
Claims and generally accepted the position of the Department of Justice.
The contract boards, while not active litigants in these disputes, have been
keen observers of their interests and effective publicists of their views, which
generally have favored the Supreme Court's (as opposed to the Court of
Claims') approach to disputes clauses. Contractors, while glad to have an
efficient quasi-judicial departmental remedy, have been generally sympathetic
to the Court of Claims position, since they desire to preserve as full an oppor-
tunity for judicial review as possible. The influence of the contractors on
Congress has been a significant one.
A. United States v. Moorman
The cycle of judicial and legislative interaction began in 1950 with the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Moorman,
82 involving a con-
tractor's attempt to recover for work done which allegedly had not been re-
quired by the contract specifications.
Moorman was handled by the Supreme Court as a straight contract in-
terpretation case, without much explicit cognizance of its institutional impli-
cations. The relationship of two contract clauses was at issue. One clause,
in the "specifications" of the contract, provided that if a contractor felt any
work demanded of him to be outside the requirements of the contract, he
must utilize the departmental disputes procedure and be finally bound by the
contract board decision. The second clause was a standard dispute clause,
which limited the finality of board decisions to questions of fact.
8 3 The con-
tractor convinced the Court of Claims that his grievance was one of contract
interpretation, a "question of law"; the issue was not, then, covered by the
dispute clause of the contract. The Court of Claims held that the dispute
provision in the specifications was subordinate to and controlled by the stand-
82. 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
83. Compare paragraphs 2-16 of the specifications, id. at 458-59, with the disputes
clause involved, id. at 459.
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ard dispute clause contained in the "formal" contract; despite the specifications
clause, finality would only be accorded board determination of questions of
fact. Consequently, the Court of Claims ignored the contract board's resolu-
tion of the case, made new findings of fact pursuant to its determination of
the law question, and awarded to the contractor Inore than he had received
from the board. 4
The Supreme Court, however, found the contractor's intent in the speci-
fications provision, rather than in the more limited contract dispute clause.
By finding that the contractor had indicated his desire, by contract, for final
board review of "all disputes," the Court did not have to reach the question
of whether under the terms of the standard disputes clause the Court of Claims
might properly take evidence de novo on questions of contract interpretation.85
The Supreme Court's pique with the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court's
realization that its holding was opening a way for the allocation of final de-
termination of questions of law to the contract boards, were evident:
The oft-repeated conclusion of the Court of Claims that questions of
"interpretation" are not questions of fact is ample reason why the parties
to the contract should provide for final determination of such disputes
by a method wholly separate from the fact limited provisions of the
[finality clause).86
It is noteworthy that the Court chose this broad approach rather than relying
on other Justice Department arguments which would have had less impact
on the finality dispute between the contract boards and the Court of Claims.
8 7
Even when reading the case as a resolution of a contract dispute, the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Moorman seems to be insensitive to some of the
problems presented. The contractor had entered into a contract of adhesion,88
yet the Court treated it as if it had been the product of actual bargaining.
Perhaps the contractor had been aware of the specifications dealing with
disputes; but equally plausible was his assertion that he was concerned only
with the specifications for the job he had undertaken, and that he had not
considered that the specifications might establish substantive rights.89 Nor
did the Court ever acknowledge the truly ambiguous relationship between
the specifications and contract clauses or mention the traditional contract
doctrine that ambiguous adhesionary clauses are construed against the drafter. 0
84. Ibid. In so doing, it protected the contractor from incurring losses not produced
by his own fault. See Brief for Respondents, pp. 2-7, United States v. Moorman, 338
U.S. 457 (1950).
85. United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 463 (1950).
86. Ibid. (emphasis added). The Court also sharply criticized the Court of Claims
"hostility" to the disputes clauses which had resulted in "blindness to a plain intent." Id.
at 462.
87. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 30-36, United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457
(1950).
88. See note 6 supra.
89. Brief of Respondents, pp. 9-14, United, States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
90. Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U.S. 165, 172 (1914) ; United States v. Spearin,
248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918) ; Reading Steel Casting v. United States, 268 U.S. 186 (1925).
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In short, the Court's vision in Moornun seems to have been consciously
limited to upholding contract clauses permitting final resolution of all dis-
putes to be made within the executive departments. There are several possible
explanations for this narrow focus. Perhaps the Court was merely trying to in-
dicate that its decision in an earlier case upholding an "all disputes" clause 
0 '
must be broadly respected; viewed in this light, Moorman is a sharp rebuke to
the Court of Claims, which may have ignored the earlier decision. Broader policy
concerns, however, may also be sensed in the opinion. The Court may have
envisaged contract boards as knowledgeable and experienced federal agencies
administering a complex and expensive-to-litigate area of government action;
since appellate review by the contract boards provided sufficient protection
for the contractors, judicial review could be confined within narrow bounds.
Or the Court may have felt that the government's interest as a private orderer
was at stake ;92 by opening the door to departmental insulation of adminis-
trative contract proceedings, the Court may have sought both to give the
executive departments the ability to rely on low bids made with cognizance
of the dispute mechanism provisions, 93 and to allow them to litigate the great
bulk of their disputes in a forum sensitive to departmental procurement needs.
94
Whatever its policy motivations may have been, in Moorman the Court
effectively reallocated the institutional responsibilities of boards and courts
to sharply diminish the relative importance of the latter's role. In effect, the
Supreme Court invited executive departments to utilize their superior bar-
gaining position to preclude virtually all court review of questions of law.
In so doing the Court, perhaps unconsciously, solved some of the problems
of de novo review by the Court of Claims - but only at the expense of deny-
ing contractors the right to a hearing by a tribunal wholly separated from
the executive department which was party to the contract dispute.
B. United States v. Wunderlich
In United States v. Wunderlich 
95 the Supreme Court laid down principles
governing the extent of finality to be accorded determinations of "fact" made
by executive departments and contract boards.
9 6 The contractor had sought
to increase his compensation for a construction project on the ground that
the contracting officer's method of computing the adjustments was improper.
The Court of Claims found the Interior Department's equitable adjustment
computations "arbitrary and capricious," declared itself therefore not bound
91. The Court referred to its intent to reaffirm the principle laid down in its per
curiam decision in United States v. John McShain, Inc., 308 U.S. 512, modified, 308 U.S.
520, which it felt had been flouted. Id. at 461. Perhaps it made its position plain at the
expense of the merits of the instant case.
92. Cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127-29 (1940).
93. See note 100 infra, discussing the articulation of this policy by the Department of
justice in Wunderlich.
94. Cf. Brief for Petitioner, p. 15, United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
95. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
96. The disputes clause at issue is set out in id. at 99.
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by departmental fact determination, and awarded a judgment to the con-
tractor. 7 This standard of review was deemed improper by the Supreme
Court, which held that the departmental decision had to be treated as final
in the Court of Claims unless conscious fraud was alleged. 98 A narrow reading
of its previous decisions and an emphasis on the voluntary quality of contract
negotiation were the sole bases of the Court's decision. 99 100 While the Court
thus engraved an invitation for Congress to expand the scope of judicial re-
view of contract board findings.' 0 ' it left little doubt that in its view traditional
doctrines of contract law, considerations of administrative neatness within
executive departments, and concern with government economy in the procure-
ment program had carried the day.10 2
The Court's opinion in Wunderlich complemented Moornan's treatment
of questions of law by cutting back the Court of Claims' scope of review of
contract board decisions on questions of fact. No longer could the Court
of Claims utilize the standards - arbitrary, capricious, bad faith, or lack of
substantial evidence - developed over the years to overturn contract board
determinations.
103
This reallocation of power evoked dissent in Wunderlich from Supreme
Court Justices whose concern was with the fairness of the process, rather
97. The Court indicates, "although there was some dispute below, the parties now
agree that the question decided by the department head was a question of fact." Ibid.
(emphasis added). The Department of Justice apparently had initially argued that the
case represented an attempt by the Court of Claims to circumvent Moorman. See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 2-3, United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
98. 342 U.S. at 100.
99. Ibid.
100. An interesting gloss on the freedom of contract rationale for contract board
finality was made in the Department of Justice's brief:
The judicial function in [disputes clause] review situations is quite different from
that traditionally involved in the review of administrative determinations. Article
15 disputes clause is a contractual not a statutory provision. It embodies a deliberate
bargain - if made honestly and in good faith, and is not to be the subject of court
litigation. Like every other provision of a government contract, it is an element
which doubtless affects the contract price.
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14-15, United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951) (em-
phasis added).
The Court was also invited to (and evidently did) view the problem from the stand-
point of the government as a private party seeking to maximize its own economic ad-
vantage:
The obvious purpose of such provisions is to avoid the expense and delay of
litigation.... [T]he advantages of competitive bidding will be lost to the Govern-
ment if contractors are requested to submit bids on the basis of a contract provid-
ing for the final settlement of disputes by the department head, and the successful
bidder is later permitted to disregard this requirement which undoubtedly xvas given
substantial weight in the bids of others.
Ibid.
101. 342 U.S. at 100.
102. The opinions have been characterized as having a "curiously laissez-faire tone,
almost an archaic or nostalgic ring . . " Braucher, Arbitration Under Government Con-
tracts, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 473, 500 (1952).
103. See notes 14, 15 supra.
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than solely with its efficiency. Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized that the
majority's destruction of judicial review threw out of kilter the balance be-
tween the executive and the judiciary; by subjecting the contractors to poten-
tially "tyrannous" behavior of contracting officers, he asserted, it endangered
individual liberty.10 4 Perhaps because there had been no contract board in the
Interior Department, Douglas's opinion indicated no awareness of the ex-
istence of contract boards and of the possibility that such boards might either
reduce or aggravate these dangers. 05 Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting sepa-
rately, 0 6 emphasized that the finality clause enabled the contracting officer
to assume a peculiar position of power. Asserting suggestively that "men
are more often bribed by their loyalties and ambitions than by money,"'10 7
Jackson urged that a fiduciary duty, embodying the "vanishing standard of
good faith and care"' 08 should be placed on the government contracting offi-
cers and should be the basis of judicial review. There is an implicit tension
in Jackson's opinion between the hope that contracting officers would exercise
self-restraint in the exercise of their newly sanctioned power and the tradi-
tional concept that one body (contracting officers and boards) could only
be held in check if subjected to another (the Court of Claims). Justice
Jackson, however, failed to indicate any rationale for his position of limiting
agency finality, other than elementary notions of fairness; he pressed no
analogy either to contracts of adhesion or to the administrative process. Nor
did he suggest a basic structural reorganization of the contract boards or
the Court of Claims.
C. The "Wunderlich Act"
Unswayed by judicial freedom of contract arguments, 00 and pressed hard
by contractors anxious to preserve their access to the courts,110 Congress
responded to the Wunderlich decision by enacting a law designed to enlarge
the channels of judicial review of executive department contract dispute
dispositions."' The "Wunderlich Act" provides:
104. 342 U.S. 98, 101 (dissenting opinion, in which Reed, J., concurred).
105. In Wiederlich the Secretary reviewed the contract officer's decision, and fully
approved it, without a hearing. Schultz, Proposed Changes in Government Disputes
Settlement, 67 HARv. L. Rxv. 217, 232-33 (1953).
106. 342 U.S. at 102.
107. Id. at 103.
108. Ibid.
109. See, e.g., House Wunderlich Hearings 47 (Representatives Celler and Willis),
39 (Representative Walter).
110. Id. at 10-12 (testimony of vice president and counsel of the Wunderlich Con-
tracting Co.). The Court of Claims had made plain the harsh significance of the Wun-
derlich decision to contractors in Palace Corp. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 545 (1953).
111. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, FINALrrY CLAUSES IN GOVERNMENT
CoNTRAcTs, S. REP. No. 1670, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
WUNDERLICH REPORT].
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Section 321
No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating
to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any de-
partment or agency or duly authorized representative or board in a
dispute involving a question arising under such contract shall be pleaded
in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any
such decision to cases where fraud by such official or said representative
or board is alleged. Provided, however, that any such decision shall be
final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbi-
trary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not
supported by substantial evidence.
Section 322
No government contract shall contain a provision making final on a
question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative,
or board.11 2
The first sentence of Section 321 plainly was intended to overrule Wunderlich.
The proviso was to embody the standards of judicial review. Section 322
was intended to overrule Moorman: due to ambiguities in the Moorman
opinion, however, overruling may have meant either to prevent the contract
board from deciding questions of law with finality even in the absence of a
contract provision, or - reading the case more restrictively - to prevent
merely the use of contract clauses, similar to that in Moorman, binding con-
tractors to the legal findings of non-judicial bodies." 3
The Wunderlich Act represented a compromise of many interests. It at-
tempted to resolve the immediate problem of the scope of judicial review
without coming to grips with the institutional problems inherent in the ques-
tion of whether judicial review should be based on de novo evidence or on
the record. One reason for this was almost certainly the ambiguity which
existed in the role of the GAO, which asserted the same right of review in
its audits as any court. Because of a fear that the GAO would use a broader
based standard of review to reverse more frequently contract board decisions
favorable to contractors, some large military contractors, otherwise desirous
of judicial review, shrank from urging that contract board finality be cut
back.114 Another explanation for the act's ambiguous treatment of the nature
of judicial review may derive from the varying interests in judicial review
among contractors themselves. Those contractors bound by contracting officers'
decisions (i.e., in departments with no contract appeal boards) wanted to
stand on equal footing with the government's representatives. For them,
de novo review in the Court of Claims was clearly preferable; the possibility
of review was seen as a means of protection against arbitrary or capricious
112. 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (1958).
113. These two interpretations can be extracted from HousE WUNDERLIcH REPoRT 5.
114. But compare House Wunderlich Hearings 91-95 (representative of Aircraft
Industries Association); id. at 104-06 (representative of Radio-Electronics-Television
Manufacturer's Association), with id. at 5 (statement of general contractor less con-
cerned with the impact of GAO review); id. at 127-28 (a sweeping proposal, doing away
with the law-fact distinction and retaining GAO review).
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treatment by contract officers." 5 On the other hand, contractors who had
recourse to departmental contract boards were generally satisfied with judicial
review on the record - provided that it was assured that the contract board's
record would be complete and its procedures fair." 6
These conflicting interests influencing Congress may also have caused the
ambiguity in the standards applicable to court review of contract board de-
terminations of fact. The House Report may be read to suggest that two
different standards of review are embodied in the act." 7 The standards
drawn from earlier cases - fraud, caprice, gross error, bad faith - would
mainly, though not exclusively, be of use in keeping contract officers in line.
The "substantial evidence" test, drawn from the APA, was apparently viewed
as the basis for correction of the "lack of uniformity" and quality in pro-
cedures among the various departments. 18 It is thus possible that Congress
may have included the substantial evidence test less as a guide to judicial
review than as an admonition to the contract boards to improve their pro-
cedures.119 The legislative history is, however, subject to the alternative
plausible interpretation that Congress intended the contract board to be re-
viewed in the same manner as courts would review independent agencies
subject to the APA. Under this theory, contract board determinations of
fact could only be upset when they failed to meet the substantial evidence
test. Support for this latter view can be found in the frequent mention of
the APA in the House Report, as well as in the testimony by the American
Bar Association in the congressional hearings. °20
A second cause of the ambiguity as to the meaning and role of the sub-
stantial evidence test may be the fact that controversy over the proper roles
of contract boards and courts, which characterized the relevant litigation,
115. Id. at 12, 13 (discussion of subpar departmental proceedings by counsel for
Wunderlich).
116. Compare the testimony of John. W. Gaskins, attorney, id. at 78-79 (emphasizing
need for the improvement of quasi-judicial review in departments such as the Veterans
Administration), with his testimony in Senate Wunderlich Hearings 35 (emphasizing
the lack of any real quasi-judicial review in others, such as the Interior Department, and
contrasting this lack with the developed procedures of the ASBCA).
117. House Wunderlich Report 4.
118. It is believed that if the standard of substantial evidence is adopted this con-
dition [lack of uniformity] will be corrected and that the records of hearing officers
will hereafter contain all the .. . evidence upon which they have relied in making
their decisions .... It would not be possible to justify the retention of the finality
clauses in Government contracts unless the hearing procedures were conducted in
such a way as to require each party to present openly its side of the controversy
and afford an opportunity of rebuttal.
Id. at 5.
119. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petitioa for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 18,
19, United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
120. HousE WUNDERLICH REPORT 45. See House Wunderlich Hearings 88-91 (state-
ment of David Reich).
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was virtually absent at the hearings.' 2 ' The Wunderlich Act does not purport
to define the procedures of the contract boards; it clearly does not apply
the APA to them.12 2 Although the act is divided into "fact" and "law" sections,
this was probably intended not as a basis for a re-allocation of functions -
though in the cases prior to the act the concepts had been used for that pur-
pose - but rather to remedy what were regarded as important injustices
resulting from the Wunderlich and Moorman cases respectively. 2 3
Whatever the reasons for the act's ambiguity regarding standards of review,
the consequences of choosing between its alternative readings are significant.
Treating the substantial evidence test as a broad admonitory standard of
review would make it possible for the Court of Claims to overturn many board
determinations as having been improper and would enable the court to con-
duct more de novo hearings.124 Application of the APA-type substantial
evidence test would limit the Court of Claims' opportunity to overturn con-
tract board findings of fact and reduce the number of de novo hearings which
could be held by the court. The Wunderlich Act, in short, left the relationship
between the contract boards and the Court of Claims in as much doubt as
it left the form of judicial review which was to be applied.
D. Construction of the Wunderlich Act by the Federal Courts
Following the Wunderlich Act, the Department of Justice ceased empha-
sizing contract arguments and adopted the position that if there is "substantial
evidence" in the administrative record to support a contract appeals board
holding, the Court of Claims may not make de novo findings of fact unless
the contractor makes a showing of fraud, or at least gross procedural un-
fairness. Thus framed, the issue logically breaks down into two traditional
administrative law questions: (1) What degree of evidence must a court
find to uphold an administrative agency? and (2) Shall courts hold a trial
de novo on matters already administratively processed?
The great majority of lower federal courts accepted the administrative
law frame of reference, and almost always refused to review de novo contract
board findings..2 5 First, the district and circuit courts decided whether they
121. But see House Wmiderlich Hearings 46 (representative of Department of Jus-
tice).
122. Rather, it appears, the focus was on the institution of judicial review alone.
Compare House Wunderlich Hearings 89 (American Bar Association Representative),
with HousE WUNDERLIcH REPORT at 4.
123. HouSE WUNDERLICH REPORT 1, 5.
124. Substantial evidence would then become a term of art of a special nature in the
government contract area, justifying a broad review of contract board procedures and
holdings.
125. These arguments are well marshaled in Mann Chem. Labs, Inc. v. United States,
174 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mass. 1958). Another concern of the district courts in the cases
cited infra was, of course, the duplication, of board and court hearings, resulting in greater
expense of time and money. See also United States v. MacKinnon, 289 F.2d 908 (9th
Cir. 1961); Hoffmann v. United States, 276 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1960); Lowell 0. West
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were facing a judicially cognizable "question of law" or a "question of fact"
whose finality was defined by Wunderlich Act tests. If the former, de novo
evidence was sometimes heard. If the latter, the only question the courts
chose to face was whether "substantial evidence" existed to support the
contract board's findings, a question which logically seemed soluble only
by looking at the record accumulated before the boards. Support for this
approach was drawn from administrative law, where "supported by substan-
tial evidence" is a term of art implying review on the record, and from the
Wunderlich Act's legislative history. Two circuit courts of appeal, however,
while accepting the law-fact distinction as a meaningful one in most contexts,
suggested that a functional approach might be taken to the question of when
de novo review of facts was proper. Thus, the Second Circuit held that de
novo hearings would be afforded contractors in circumstances where the
evidence presented by the government was "so insubstantial as to make it
a question of lay"' 6 or where there was some indication that the contractor
"was precluded from introducing before the administrative tribunal whatever
evidence it wished to present."' 2 7 In United States v. Blake Construction 128
the District of Columbia Circuit went slightly further in developing a func-
tional approach. Faced with a problem of contract reformation, which, unlike
questions of whether certain work falls under contract specifications, is not
a matter requiring expert determination, the court held that since the district
judge was probably better equipped to handle the question than a contract
board, he should be permitted to make de novo findings of fact if necessary.
It therefore denied summary judgment for the government, and remanded
to the district court for de novo review.
The Court of Claims' approach differed radically from that of other federal
courts.2 9 It rejected the idea that the Wunderlich Act had transformed the
Lumber Sales v. United States, 270 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1959); Wells and Wells, Inc. v.
United States, 269 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1959) ; Langoma Lumber Corp. v. United States,
232 F2d 886 (3d Cir. 1956); M. Berger Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 22 (W.D.
Pa. 1961). For a discussion of these cases, see Harrison, Eight Years After Wunderlich
- Confusion in the Courts, 28 GEo. WAsu. L. REv. 561 (1960).
126. United States v. Hamden Co-op Creamery Co., 297 F.2d 130, 135 (1961) (em-
phasis added). On its face, this statement may seem sophistical. For clarification, see Jaffe,
Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1020 (1956).
127. Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963).
128. 296 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Reformation of contract cases are not handled by
contract boards such as the ASBCA, and hence the Blake problem will not arise in the
Defense Department. Spector Interview. The Department of Justice has questioned the
validity of the Blake decision. See Brief for Appellee, Silverman Bros. v. United States,
324 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1963). Compare Note, 48 VA. L. REv. 756 (1962), with Note, 75
HAv. L. REv. 1645 (1962).
129. See, e.g., Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 571, 151 F. Supp. 817,
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1957) ; H. L. Yoh Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 493 (Ct. Cl.
1961). Prior to the Wunderlich Act, the Court of Claims had taken de novo evidence in
cases which had been before the contract boards. See, e.g., Wagner Whirler & Derrick
Corp. v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 382, 121 F. Supp. 664 (1954).
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contract boards into administrative agencies, and had, correlatively, trans-
formed the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims into that of an appellate court.
It leveled serious criticism at contract board deficiencies in building its record,
and emphasized that the Wunderlich Act had made no provision in this
regard. Conceding the logic of having review on the record, it rejected this
approach on the practical ground that it would lead to a need for two pro-
ceedings: one at which the administrative record - "in many cases a mythical
entity"' 30 - was pieced together and evaluated; and the second, if shown
to be required by the inadequacy of the administrative record, a de novo
evidence review. The court also emphasized its view that the Wunderlich
Act had restored the entire government review situation to its pre-Wunderlich
status, including the nature and scope of review by the Court of Claims.' 31
The Court of Claims did adopt a summary judgment procedure based on the
administrative record, 32 but this was small solace to the Department of Justice,
which successfully sought certiorari in United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.133
E. United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.
In Bianchi the contractor was seeking additional compensation for safety
provisions which he had installed in a tunnel he was building under contract.
The government challenged the right of the Court of Claims to reverse the
contract board and to award compensation to a contractor under the standard
"changed conditions" clause of the contract after a de novo trial, at which
some crucial testimony was presented by witnesses who had not appeared
before the Board of Claims and Appeals of the Corps of Engineers.134 In the
government's view, since there was "substantial evidence" on the board's
record, the case should not have been re-opened. The board, it argued, had
been treated as a mere "trial run," and had not been given an opportunity
to consider and process the case fully.13  Moreover, the appeal to the Court
of Claims had taken place six years after the Board's ruling,1 8 by which time
possible witnesses might well have died or relevant material might have be-
come unavailable. On the other hand, as the dissenters in Bianchi emphasized,
130. Volentine & Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 641, 145 F. Supp. 952,
954 (1956) (Madden, J.).
131. Judge Littleton, concurring, id. at 955-56, emphasized the sketchiness (and non-
jurisdictional nature) of the Wunderlich Act, and made the point that if Congress had
wanted to limit judicial review, it was perfectly capable of making this clear.
132. See P.L.S. Coat & Suit Corp. v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 296, 180 F. Supp.
400, 407 (1960), holding that before trial de novo could be granted, plaintiff must show
from the record that a genuine issue of material fact existed. Arguably, the court's action
in this case might be characterized as a type of appellate review.
133. 373 U.S. 709 (1963). See Comment, 52 GEo. L.J. 189 (1963); Note, 62 MicH.
L. REv. 1075 (1964).
134. 373 U.S. at 711, 712.
135. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the United States, pp. 2, 13, United States
v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Cert. Brief].
136. 373 U.S. at 711.
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"subnormal administrative procedures" had marked the formulation of the
Board's decision, which had been based on a letter which "somehow, in a
manner not disclosed by the record" had come into its hands. There had
been no opportunity to rebut the letter's contents until the case was before
the Court of Claims.
137
The Supreme Court's opinion was framed as an interpretation of the
Wunderlich Act and its legislative history' 38s - a difficult task, in view of
the competing policies represented in the act's cryptic language' 3 9 Although
the government was apparently arguing only that de novo evidence should
not have been taken because "substantial evidence" existed on the adminis-
trative record, 140 the Court's holding went further:
Apart from questions of fraud, determinations of the finality to be
attached to a departmental decision on a question arising under a "dispute"
clause must rest solely on consideration of the record before the de-
partment'141
Thus, the standards of arbitrary, capricious, and in bad faith were subsumed
under the substantial evidence test. The Court supported this position by
analogizing the court-board relationship to the judicial review of administra-
137. 373 U.S. 709, 720-21. (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.). The dis-
sent adopts many of the arguments of Judge Madden in Volentine & Littleton, 136 Ct. Cl.
638, 145 F. Supp. 952 (1950). Judge Madden was also the author of the Court of Claims'
Bianchi opinion, 144 Ct. Cl. 500, 169 F. Supp. 514 (1959), cert. granted, 371 U.S. 939
(1962). In the context of the facts of the case, the dissenters emphasized the exemption
of the boards from APA §§ 5, 7. 373 U.S. at 721.
138. The majority drew heavily, though without reference, on Judge Laramore's dis-
sent in Volentine, supra note 137.
139. See the discussion of the Wunderlich Act at notes 109-23 supra and accompany-
ing text.
140. U.S. Cert. Brief, p. 2, omitted reference to any Wunderlich Act test - e.g.,
"arbitrary," "capricious," "bad faith" - except "substantial evidence" in its framing of
the question presented by the case.
141. 373 U.S. at 714.
First, the bill was entitled an act "to permit review." Review, where procedurally not
provided for, had been held to be confined to the administrative record. Citing Tagg Bros.
& Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930) ; National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943). These cases are not necessarily in point. They involved
rate-fixing and regulation promulgation - typical administrative agency functions, which
were not involved in Bianchi. Moreover, these operations have come under the APA. See
note 137 supra. If the Court was urging Congress to create a procedure act for contract
boards, it might have been more argumentative, rather than assertive of existing "fact,"
in its opinion.
Second, the Court pointed out, 373 U.S. at 715, that "substantial evidence" was a term
of art associated with review limited to the administrative record. As indicated above, the
role which the substantial evidence test was to play was unclear at the time of the passage
of the Wunderlich Act; as will be shown, there is doubt as to what meaning Congress
ultimately intended to affix to the term - i.e., whether the test was intended to be applied
in the same way in the board-court context as in the APA and the Taft-Hartley Act.
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tive agencies. The Court strongly emphasized the administrative law conno-
tations of the terms used in the Wunderlich Act and the House Report; con-
gressional intent to provide contractors with judicial relief similar to that
before Wunderlich was played down. 14 Finally, as a basic objection to Court
of Claims de novo review, the Court emphasized an important practical ad-
ministrative concern: the avoidance of "needless duplication of evidentiary
hearings and a heavy additional burden in time and expense... surely delay
at its worst."'1 43 The picture the Court created was of an interest in the per-
fection of the administrative process. The Court thus chose to adopt the
narrow APA standard of fact review rather than the admonitory standard
which would have given broader scope to Court of Claims review.
The Supreme Court then sought to accommodate the obvious congressional
concern with the improvement of contract board procedures by formulating
an alternative means of Court of Claims supervision over contract board pro-
cedures. The Court asserted that the policy underlying the Wunderlich Act
necessitated a procedure somewhat analogous to the federal courts' doctrine
of abstention :144
In situations where the Court [of Claims] believed that.., the depart-
mental determination could not be sustained under the standards laid
down by Congress [procedural standards suggested by the Wunderlich
Act] ... the Court could ... stay its own proceedings pending some
further action before the agency involved.' 1 5
Should an agency fail to remedy a particular "substantive or procedural"
inadequacy, the Court of Claims would then find for the contractor 141 __
though in cases where the merits supported the government's case, the theory
on which this would be done is unclear. The Court thus assumed that the
Court of Claims could make out what standards of board due process Congress
142. 373 U.S. at 715-16. But see discussion of contractors' different interests, at notes
109-17 supra and accompanying text.
143. 373 U.S. at 717.
144. See Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of Means
and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964).
145. 373 U.S. at 717-18 (emphasis added).
146. 373 U.S. at 718. The Court thus provides for two situations in which the Court
of Claims may reverse the determination of the contract board, the other being where
decision for the contractor is justified on the face of the administrative record. Perhaps,
the Court had in mind the kind of model proposed by Chairman Spector of the ASBCA,
20 FED. B.J. 398, 407 (1960), where he suggested that the Court of Claims should make
a threshold judgment as to procedural regularity; and if satisfied that a contract board's
proceeding has been procedurally satisfactory, it should proceed to review the board on
the record, according to the standards of the Wunderlich Act. (Spector suggested, how-
ever, that should the board procedure prove below par, the Court of Claims should take
de novo evidence in the case.) Id. at 408. Spector does not think the whole remand prob-
lem of great relevance. 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 87, 95 n.41 (1964). Consequently, he
does not think much use will be made of the Court of Claims new uniformity enforcing
powers. Spector Interview.
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had laid down,' 47 and could negatively coerce "uniformity"'
48 in contract
board procedures.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Bianchi was its first conscious attempt
to work out a relationship between the bodies responsible for resolving gov-
ernment contract disputes. However, the Court's decision is flawed in that,
like many judicial attempts to rectify legislative inaction or ambiguity, it
sought to use courts to implement policies for which the legislature could
have created more sharply honed tools. 149 The time and expense of applying
its "abstention" doctrine may become as great as would be involved in full-
scale Court of Claims review of the boards. The Court of Claims has no
remand power to the contract boards. It can only stay its proceedings and
let contractors return, on some unspecified theory, to the boards.
10 Nor is it
clear how the boards will react to this improvised remand procedure: will
boards try to retain their challenged procedure by raising the amount of a
contractor's award in order to discourage further appeal, or will they make
honest efforts to correct their procedures?
It is also unclear what additional remedies are available to contractors for
board heel-dragging or non-uniform response to procedural challenges. A
contractor in such an "abstention" situation lacks a final Court of Claims
judgment on which he can seek certiorari to the Supreme Court, and he may
find himself unable to get his case speedily re-examined by a recalcitrant
contract board. The Court's suggestion, moreover, may tend to aggravate
court-board relations by assigning to the Court of Claims the role of continual
overseer of contract board procedures. Finally, it is certainly questionable
whether the Court of Claims - a commercial court with a crowded docket -
is suited to making such decisions regularly. It is unfair, in sum, to put a
147. Schultz, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 115, 126 n.49 (1964), suggests that such
a standard will be based on Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), and Morgan
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938), which had been recognized by the Court of Claims
as applicable to the boards prior to Wunderlich. See also the Bianchi dissenters, 373 U.S.
at 720. Cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778-87 (1963).
148. 373 U.S. at 718.
149. Cf. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAgv. L. REV. 1 (1957).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 670-71 (1949). When reviewing
administrative agencies. courts generally do have power to order that additional evidence
be taken by the agencies. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1066 (1938), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 210 (1958); National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 455 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958).
The Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202 (1960), cited by the Court in
defense of its theory, 373 U.S. at 717-18, held it error for the Court of Claims to render
a judgment based on an Interstate Commerce Commission order prior to determination
of the order's validity by the District Court. The Court of Claims should have stayed its
proceedings until that ruling was made. Query how much in, point is that decision, which
concerned not review proceedings but a determination of rate reasonability and applica-




contractor in the position of having to ride a pogo stick between the Court
of Claims and a contract board in search of adequate procedures when his
livelihood - particularly if he is litigating to maintain his profit margin -
is dependent on the manner and extent to which he pursues this course. 151
Even if the stay procedure outlined by the Supreme Court can be effectively
worked out so as not to prejudice a contractor, there are other problems
present in the Court's opinion in Bianchi. For example, what has become
of the procedural tests of "arbitrary" and "capricious" of the Wunderlich
Act? If a contractor alleges that a contract board utilized extra-record in-
formation in reaching its decision, would a de novo hearing be proper to es-
tablish the validity of his charge? 52 Nor does Bianchi address the issue of
board and court jurisdiction regarding "questions of law." If contract boards
reversed their current policy and began to hear breach of contract cases,
would the Court of Claims be precluded from conducting a full trial in these
cases as it has traditionally done? A similar issue faces the Court of Claims
if a contractor, who has failed below, first raises the issue of breach of
contract before the court. Shall the Court of Claims disregard those rele-
vant facts which the contract board found in the adjustment case below, or
shall its de novo hearing rehash these facts? May the court hear any addi-
tional evidence relating to the new legal theory, or must it send the case
back to the board for new findings of fact? Another area of doubt is how
the Bianchi opinion affects Court of Claims procedures where the substantial
evidence test is not met by a contract board record. Should the Court of
Claims now reverse the board decision on the face of the record, or conduct
a de novo hearing, or utilize the stay mechanism even though the case is not




Bianchi was a case with a theory. The contract boards were to be shoe-
horned into the model of independent administrative agencies - even though
they were not subject to the APA and had procedural shortcomings. The
Court of Claims was to be flattened from a split level government contracts
court which took de novo evidence to a somewhat artificial court of appeals
largely reviewing on the record. Given the material at hand, the Court has built
a system which can probably work, although it may cause an occasional out-
rageous result. Its decision is more institutionally oriented than earlier ones.
But it still falls short of offering a satisfactory solution to the complex insti-
tutional problem of administering government contracts and adjudicating
contract disputes.
151. Perhaps this overstates the problem. Chairman Spector asserts that on remand
contract boards would act quickly. Spector Interview. But Commissioner Gamer em-
phasizes that shuttling a contractor back and forth between court and board may even-
tually lead him to give up the pursuit of his remedy. Gamer Interview.
152. See Schultz, supra note 147, at 126-27.
153. Compare ibid. with Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 290, 296-301 (1964).
19641 1441
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
F. Judicial Response to Bianchi
In several cases since Bianchi the Department of Justice has sought to
internalize almost all findings of fact in government contract disputes within
executive departments, even if the questions of fact are the basis for the de-
termination of questions of law. Thus in Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United
States' 54 the department took the position that the Court of Claims may
never take evidence in a lawsuit arising under a contract containing a disputes
clause regardless of the theory of the action.155 Acceptance of the department's
contention would have resulted, in many respects, in a return to the situation
existing prior to the passage of the Wunderlich Act: since decisions on ques-
tions of law are often dependent upon findings of fact, sometimes the Court
of Claims' scope of review on questions of law would be limited to the point
where board determinations of law questions would effectively be final.150
In Stein Bros., and again in Wingate Construction Co. v. United States,'"T
the Court of Claims rejected the government assertion that it was barred by
Bianchi from taking de novo evidence. Placing itself in clear opposition to the
Department of Justice's position, the court reiterated the continuing validity
of the law-fact distinction, and made it clear that it would consider a great
many issues subject to de novo review under the generous rubric of "questions
of law." And in WPC Enterprises v. United States 158 it suggested that sub-
ordinate "factual" findings were wholly "subsumed" in the larger legal prob-
lem of contract interpretation, and could be re-examined de novo. The Court
of Claims also suggested in this case that if "substantial evidence" could not
be found in the record, the board decision need not be treated as final and
the court could make independent findings. The Court of Claims thus laid
154. 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2050 (Ct. Cl. July 12, 1963).
155. Memorandum of Law submitted by the Department of Justice in the Stein case,
set out in Spector, Is It "Bianchi's Ghost" - or "Much Ado About Nothing"?, 29 LAtw
& Co N MP. PROB. 87, 105-06 (1964). Related propositions advanced were:
1) All disputed questions of fact must be decided by the contracting officer and
board of contract appeals;
2) No distinction may be made between questions of fact which underlie questions
of law, and those which do not;
3) It is wholly immaterial whether the disputed question of fact concerns a matter
over which the agency may (or may iot) grant relief;
4) It is immaterial whether boards of contract appeals decided questions of law,
only their determinations of fact questions are entitled to finality.
Ibid. (emphasis added) : See the discussion, id. at 106 n.85, for an indication of the way
the Justice Department would "use" the contract boards if its position were accepted.
Spector does not accept this position, id. at 106-07.
156. "If you scrutinize a legal rule, you will see that it is a conditional statement
referring to facts." FRAm, COURTS ON TRIAL 14 (1963 ed.).
157. 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2398 (Ct. Cl. Jan. 24, 1964).
158. 323 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1963). See Schultz, supra note 147, at 124-25; Note, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 290, 311 (1964).
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the foundations for fairly extensive de novo review of facts.1 9 The Justice
Department will certainly press its position, and may well be more successful
in the district and circuit courts.160 The Wunderlich cycle of haphazard board,
court and legislative tugging and pulling will continue, passing by the funda-
mental questions as to the nature and the role of the institutions involved.161
IV. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
DISPUTES RESOLUTION - AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Where the Wunderlich cycle will lead is unclear. In response to Bianchi,
several alternative resolutions of the contract disputes problem have been
formulated. Some of these are based on an acceptance and elaboration of
the Bianchi decision; some are more drastic in nature. What follows is an
evaluation of the likely lines of development and the current proposals to
modify or divert their course. Finally, an institutional solution to the problem
will be suggested, synthesizing elements of some of the proposals.
A. Development of the Status Quo - Application of
Administrative Law Concepts
Bianchi suggested that henceforth contract boards are to be treated as
independent administrative agencies; the Court thus implied that the scope
of judicial review of the contract boards was to be governed by the concepts
developed in administrative law. It is submitted that these concepts - specifi-
cally "law-fact" and "substantial evidence" - are poor guides to a meaning-
ful judicial review in the government contracts area and to a permanent
allocation of roles between court and board.
1. The law-fact distinction
The law-fact distinction, 16 2 the Court of Claims' chosen battlefield for pre-
serving its jurisdiction, is one of shifting sands. While historically of some
meaning in drawing a line between judge and jury,163 the distinction has
thus far proved elusive as a tool for separating the proper functions of non-
judicial bodies from those of the courts. Commentators have suggested that
law and fact are merely labels pasted by courts on particular situations as
they arise, in order to reflect a policy determination as to the appropriateness
of review.'6 4 The Supreme Court has often sidestepped the law-fact issue
entirely by asking simply whether a "rational basis" existed for adminis-
159. See Schultz, supra note 147, at 126 n.27; Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 290, 312-14
(1964) (considering the relative merits of the Court of Claims and Department of Justice
positions as illuminated by the HOUSE WuNDERmcH REPORT).
160. See, e.g., Silverman Bros., Inc. v. United States, 324 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1963).
161. The contract board will not necessarily be unhappy with this development. See
Spector, supra note 155, at 104-07.
162. See Birnbaum, Questions of Law and Fact and the Jurisdiction of the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, 19 FED. BJ. 120 (1959).
163. 9 WIGMRE, EIDENCE § 2549 (3d ed. 1940).
164. 4 DAvIs, AI mSiNisTRATIE LAW § 30.02 (1938). Davis distinguishes between the
analytical approach which judges purport to be using and the practical policy considera-
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trative action.165 In dealing with "mixed questions of law and fact," the
Court has sometimes recognized that it may have to overstep the analytical
line between the two, since:
[Wihere what purports to be a finding upon a question of fact is so
involved with and dependent upon questions of law as to be in substance
and effect a decision of the latter, the Court will, in order to decide the
legal question, examine the entire record, including the evidence if neces-
sary, as it does in cases coming from the highest court of a state.166
In dealing with "mixed" questions of law and fact in situations where it
does not wish to substitute its judgment for that of a body claiming particular
expertise, the Court has readily found all problems of petitioners to be simply
questions of fact 1 67 - despite the Court's recognition that a final decision on
the facts will often either foreclose examination of most law questions, or will
so shape the case that only one legal conclusion may follow. This would seem
especially true in the contract area in general, where the intent of the parties.
most often characterized as a question of fact, will eventually determine the
outcome of most cases. e
In short, since the law-fact distinction, as it is currently applied in the
courts, is largely policy-oriented, the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of
how the law-fact policy line shall be drawn, may well adopt the position of
the Department of Justice, and draw the line between law and fact in such
a way as to treat most matters as questions of fact cognizable by the contract
boards. This approach would, of course, leave the Court of Claims with
few questions of law to decide, and would, effectively, prevent it from con-
ducting de novo hearings in procurement contract cases.
The results of taking a more analytical approach to the law-fact distinction
are, unfortunately, no more helpful in the contract disputes context. Pro-
fessor Jaffe,' 69 the leading proponent of this approach, concedes the par-
ticularly intimate association of law and fact in the administrative process:
tions which influence their decision. Compare Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review,
56 HARv. L. RFv. 899 (1943), suggesting the difficulties in the functional approach.
165. This is a means of avoiding what a court believes improper substitution of judi-
cial for administrative determination. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 164, at § 30.03. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314
U.S. 402, 412 (1949). For critical commentary on this line of cases, see Schwartz, Gray
v. Powell and the Scope of Review, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1955).
166. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 74 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
167. See, e.g., Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). Compare DAvis, op.
cit. supra note 164, at § 30.03, with Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways
of Law and Fact, 57 HARv. L. Rsv. 753 (1944).
168. The Court of Claims is well aware of this proposition. See, e.g., Langevin v.
United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 15, 30 (1943).
169. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 239 (1955). Basically
a "finding of fact," while necessarily an inference based on evidence and not an absolute
reality, is "a description, of a phenomenon independent of law making or law applying."
Id. at 242. Law making is the "authoritative choice from among known or possible modes
of conduct... Id. at 247.
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[The] law-making aspect of the fact-finding process is particularly pro-
nounced in administrative fact-finding; for we have a fact-finder who
combines expertness and a responsibility for policy making. His experi-
ence tends to beget rules for drawing inferences, his devotion to the
purposes of the statute tends to beget presumptions for resolving doubtful
questions in favor of his theory of statutory purposeY.70
In Jaffe's view, courts should test exercises of the administrative power to
create rules having the effect of law in terms of the accordance of such rules
with what can reasonably be treated as statutory purpose.17 This principle,
though, can provide but scant guidance for the Court of Claims in its review
of contract boards. The Wunderlich Act, while authorizing Court of Claims
review on questions of law, provides the court with no statutory guidance
on the policies to be implemented on such review. Contract boards may make
decisions based not only on general notions of contract law but also on de-
partmental procurement policies. Certainly, a court review restricted to con-
siderations of general contract law would be sterile if contract boards were
not restricted to the same body of law. Even if the Court of Claims were
considered to have a role in reviewing departmental procurement policy, and
were it able to isolate these policy ingredients in contract board fact determi-
nations, how could the court evaluate a contract board's interpretation of
departmental policies? A related difficulty with applying Jaffe's analytical
approach to the law-fact distinction is that in practice contract boards do not
attempt to fragment their decisions into discrete law and fact issues. Such
separation would seem necessary in order to permit an effective court review
on the decisions of law actually made by the contract board. And, as noted
above, the Court of Claims lacks the power to remand improperly decided
cases to the contract boards for further clarification. Finally, one might
question whether any analytical approach to the law-fact distinction could be
effectively applied in the government contract area. The distinction, as cur-
rently used by the boards and the court, not only delineates the scope of
review, but also defines the jurisdictional lines between the bodies and de-
termines the right of the court to conduct de novo hearings. As such, the
dichotomy is the battleground of prerogatives between the Court of Claims
and the contract boards. The institutional consequences of the characterization
of an issue as law or fact seems too great to yield to the careful and objective
analysis required by Jaffe's approach.
2. The "Substantial Evidence" Test
In Bianchi the Court singled out the substantial evidence test for greater
emphasis than any of the other Wunderlich Act tests. 7 2 This was in keeping
with a recent trend toward the development of a "uniform conception on
170. Id. at 245.
171. See id. at 261.
172. 373 U.S. at 715.
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which to ground the judicial review of administrative findings of fact. 17 3 An
initial problem with the use of a substantial evidence test is determining the
intended content of that test - was it viewed as the equivalent of the APA
standard of review or was it meant to be less rigorous ?174 A more funda-
mental problem is that the substantial evidence test is not an abstract principle
which can be mechanically applied, but serves as a guide to courts in struc-
turing their relationships with statutorily authorized administrative bodies.
Judges most often seek a showing of conscientiousness on the part of the
administrative bodies in exchange for the deference which they extend to
administrative expertise.175 Much of the theoretical justification for judicial
deference to agency fact findings is lacking, however, in the contract board
context. The contract boards are not charged with the implementation of
statutory policies, they do not serve a ministerial function, and the need for
uniformity in their decisions would seem to be correspondingly less, at least
from the contractor's point of view. Moreover, since the basic issues in most
cases relate to contract interpretation, the contract boards may not be able
to claim a special technical knowledge or experience.
176
The indefinite quality which characterizes the substantial evidence test,
moreover, makes the standard a particularly uncertain guide to the allocation
of institutional functions in the contract dispute area. There is some evidence
that the Court of Claims will in the future use a strict substantial evidence
concept in order to overturn more board decisions and to conduct de novo
hearings. On the other hand, it seems likely that the Supreme Court will
173. Jaffe, supra note 169, at 1044-56. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 164, at § 29.01,
observes the same trend. And government counsel argued for it in Bianchi. Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 39-41, United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
174. The HouiSE WUNDERLICHa REoRT 4 refers to the definition of substantial evi-
dence - "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion" - given in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938). See Stason, "Substantial Evidence in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv.
1026, 1049-50 (1941). But the APA, cited often in the House Report, provides for a
broader review: in setting aside agency action unsupported by substantial evidence, "the
court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any
party." APA § 10(e) (emphasis added). And in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951), the Supreme Court, construing the new APA provisions, broadened the
Consolidated Edison scope of review: "The substantiality of evidence must take into
account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Id. at 488.
The HoUsE WUNDERLIcH REPORT neither cites Universal Camera nor sets up APA
standards nor expressly mentions review on the whole record. It is hence somewhat un-
clear whether the limited Consolidated Edison or the broader Universal Camera approach
was intended, by Congress or the Court, to be applied by the Court of Claims when re-
viewing a contract board's "administrative record" under the substantial evidence test.
See Schultz, supra note 147, at 125.
175. Universal Camera, supra note 174, at 488-89.
176. Commentators have emphasized the inaptness of the "administrative expertise"
argument in the review of contract boards by the Court of Claims. See Schultz, supra note
147, at 131-32; Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 290, 308-09 (1964).
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react to such an attempt to derogate from contract board finality by con-
struing the test as permitting but a narrow scope for court review of board
determinations."'
7
If the present system of judicial review of contract boards is to be per-
petuated and developed rationally, it would seem advisable for the Department
of Justice and the Court of Claims not to place too much weight upon me-
chanical application of the substantial evidence test. They should look instead
to the practical considerations which commentators have identified as properly
influencing judicial application of the substantial evidence test: e.g., the degree
to which the agency decision is actually dependent on a possessed expertise;
the relationship of the agency decision to a relevant statutory or adminis-
trative scheme; the need for judicial rather than administrative pronouncement
on a particular question; and the duty of the court as "the guardian of the
integrity of the legal system."'178 Such an approach might avoid straining the
awkward analogy which Bianchi drew between the machinery for resolving
contract disputes and the administrative process; it would not, however,
satisfy the need for a new institutional solution to the contract disputes
problem apparent to many commentators.
B. Development of the Status Quo - the Quasi-Judicialization
of the Contract Boards.
The second major thrust of Bianchi is to require both the contractor and
the executive departments to focus litigation not in the courts, but in the
contract boards. It is for this reason that the Court placed such great emphasis
on the need for the improvement of contract board procedures. Contract
board proponents have suggested, further, that once such improvements are
made, the finality of board decisions over all questions of fact will be justified.'1 9
The approach advocated is to seek the establishment of a minimum adminis-
trative due process, either through adoption of the APA - though this is
often rejected as cumbersome or unnecessary 180 - or through patchwork
reforms such as the addition of the subpoena power and the power to place
177. The Court's treatment of contract board finality throughout the Wunderlich cycle
seems indicative of this outlook on its part.
178. Jaffe, supra note 169, at 264. See also 4 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 164, at 269-70
(Davis places emphasis on the subjective opinions of administrative agencies held by
courts).
179. See Seltzer & Ryan, The Court of Claims - Review of Administrative De-
cisions, 5 BOSTON COLLEGE IND. & Comm. L. Rv. 103, 109-10 (1963); Miller, Adminis-
trative Determination and Judicial Review of Contract Appeals, 5 BosToN COLLEGE IND.
& Comm. L. REv. 111, 136-37 (1963).
180. The proposal has often been made. See Kennedy, The Conclusiveness of Ad-
ministrative Findings in Disputes Arising under Government Contracts, 4 BAYLOR L. RMV.
160, 179 (1952) ; Cuneo, Determination of Government CoWtract Disputes, 4 PRAc. LAW.
54, 66 (March, 1958) ; Note, United States v. Bianchi - The Wunderlich Cycle Again?,
32 G~o. WASH. L. REv. 118, 122 n.31, 123 (1963).
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witnesses under oath, the increased use of pre-trial briefs, and the elimination
of the possibility of reference to outside authorities,''
Retired Judge Madden of the Court of Claims has strongly opposed such
"quasi-judicialization" of contract boards, on the ground that the dispute
procedure is merely the final step in the process of negotiation of the contract,
and should not be given the status of an adjudication. In his view, the appeal
to a contract board is intended to provide procurement officials with an op-
portunity to review the decision of their departmental subordinates on a
contract matter - to "wash dirty linen in private." This position may repre-
sent a misconception of the procurement dispute process.' 8 2 Madden's ob-
jections to the increased cost to the contractor resulting from quasi-judiciali-
zation has, however, drawn support. A frequently cited virtue of the contract
boards has been that they afford speedy, inexpensive relief with a measure
of finality, insulating contractors from possible GAO reversal. ITere the
process of dispute resolution before the boards to take as long as court pro-
ceedings, one major advantage of board resolution - at least from the con-
tractors' point of view - would be negated; court review, with its formal
due process, might then be thought preferable.'
8 3
One commentator has suggested that the judicialization problem might
be solved by having the boards afford contractors an informal, non-final pro-
ceeding, in which the contractor could settle;184 an additional quasi-judicial
proceeding, final within the bounds of the Wunderlich Act, would be avail-
able within the department should the contractor be dissatisfied with the in-
formal resolution. This suggestion, while attractive on its face, and undoubtedly
a practical one for contractors in the short run, only highlights the anomalous
results to which quasi-judicialization might lead: in the name of the admnis-
181. Cuneo, supra note 180; Miller, supra note 179, at 135-37. Some of these reforms
- such as the power of subpoena and oath administration - would automatically result
from applying the APA to contract boards.
182. Madden, Bianchi's Ghost, 16 AD. L. Rrv. 22 (1963). As dispute adjudicating
bodies, the contract boards have little to do with the day-to-day process of contract ad-
ministration. On the other hand, their existence is related to the settlement of contract
disputes. See Shedd, Disputes and Appeals, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 39, 65 (1964).
[T]he opportunity for settlement by agreement continues to exist during the third
phase appeal up to the time the dispute is finally decided by the board of contract
appeals; and in many instances settlements are negotiated after an appeal is filed
and sometimes after the hearing. Not infrequently the hearing brings out facts pre-
viously unknown to one or both of the parties which produce a settlement.
Ibid.
183. See, e.g., Braucher, Arbitration under Government Contracts, 17 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 473, 501 (1952) ; Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 290, 318 (1964).
184. Schultz, supra note 147, at 130. The ASBCA presently does provide an optional
accelerated procedure in appeals amounting to $5,000 or less. These appeals are handled
on an expedited basis without regard to their normal position on the docket. If the parties
so elect, pleadings and hearings may be waived, and the appeal decided on the record. In
all other respects, the ASBCA's rules apply to the dispute. ASBCA Rule of Practice 12,
28 Fed. Reg. 9350 (1963).
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trative process and efficiency, all review would be placed within the executive
department, and the judicial review envisioned by the Wunderlich Act cut
off. Contract boards, after all, are not courts, nor are they independent ad-
ministrative agencies charged with the development and administration of a
comprehensive statutory scheme.'5 5 Their members are employees of the
executive department, not judges. Their orientation may be directed toward
departmental procurement needs as well as toward contractor equities; this
orientation might not be reflected in specific bias in an individual case, but
it will likely permeate the long-range development of precedents and regula-
tions.180 To center all judicial power in bodies nestled within executive de-
partments is contrary to the traditional American emphasis on separation of
power, and might well lead to an unreviewable body of law. Perhaps Bianchi
offers no alternative to quasi-judicialization. If this is the case, it is to be
hoped that the channels of judicial review of contract boards will be kept
open to at least the same extent as those of the ordinary administrative agency.
C. The Destruction of Bianchi- A Draconian Solution
Judge Madden, who wrote the major Court of Claims decisions in the
government contract disputes area,18 7 has embodied his long opposition to
contract board finality in legislation now before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee. The proposed legislation would blandly supplant the Wunderlich tests
of finality with no finality at all.1s5 All contract boards, in effect, would be
reduced to mere "waystations." Such a solution fails to recognize the contract
boards' experience in fact-gathering and evaluation in this area. It can be
expected, moreover, that if there were broader de novo fact review in the
Court of Claims, there would be a marked increase in appeals from the
boards, since a contractor who failed before a board would have nothing
to lose by appealing from the board's interlocutory decision. Were the number
of appeals to increase' the docket of the Court of Claims could be expected
to grow, lenghtening the already long period of time required for resolution of
185. This is the very heart of the matter. As was said by the Special Committee on
Legal Services and Procedure, Report, 81 A.B.A. REP. 491, 513 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as ABA Procedure Report] :
Where the machinery of administrative action is essentially the machinery of
litigation and adjudication, in substance equivalent to judicial adjudication, the
arguments for a full separation of functions are strongest and those against that
course weakest.
Ibid.
186. For a situation in which departmental appeals determination and procurement
policy were intimately related, see, e.g., Western Contracting Corp. v. United States, 144
Ct. Cl. 318, 325 (1958).
187. E.g., WIunderlich, Volentine, and Bianchi.
188. The positive virtues of the proposal are that it would leave the disputes proce-
dure in existence - making settlement still the norm - and, by removing the responsi-
bility for maintaining the variety of "due process" held to be concomitant with the finality
requirement, would allow a more informal procedure to be used by the contract boards.
The negative considerations discussed in the text, however, seem to outweigh these factors.
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cases in that court. The possibility of extensive GAO review would also be
increased
D. An Institutional Analysis
1. Suggestions Based on Existing Models
Rather than accepting Bianchi and trying to force the contract boards into
the administrative agency model, or destroying Bianchi, and making the con-
tract boards meaningless stops en route to judicial review, the problems inherent
in the operation of current contract dispute machinery might be resolved
by the creation of appropriate new institutions. The scope of the problem
requiring solution is quite broad: how shall the governmental departments
be regulated and fairness to the contractor be assured, when an executive
department is involved in the contractual relationship as a private party
to the contract, as administrator of the terms of the contract, and as final
arbitrator of fact disputes. The problem is exacerbated by the nature of the
contract relationship involved: contracts are by necessity open-ended; con-
tractors are dependent upon continued government largesse ;'s the govern-
ment is dependent upon uniform adherence to contract interpretations by
contractors in order to achieve its many ends.
Any institution which is developed to accommodate these interests would,
hopefully, eliminate the overlap of functions and the institutional friction
which characterize the present system. Absent such specific improvements,
the upheaval of reform would not be justified. Thus the proposed solution
should be characterized by one clear and speedy route of review, lined with
procedural safeguards in order to protect the individual contractor. Simul-
taneously, any proposed plan should provide for the uniform development of
government contract law, upon which both the government, as private orderer,
and the contractor might rely.
One possible solution, based upon the administrative agency model, would
be to mesh the procedures of the contract boards and the Court of Claims,
while still retaining the existing institutional framework of contract boards
separate from the courts. °90 This meshing would eliminate much of the juris-
dictional friction between the board and the courts, and would remove one
189. The term is used in Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), as
descriptive of the almost donor-donee relationship between a government and its citizens.
190. This solution is to be contrasted with arn alternative meshing solution, proposed
by an attorney in private practice, calling for the abolition of the boards as such and the
constitution of their members as Court of Claims commissioners operating under revised
procedures similar to those of the ASBCA. Spector Interview. Under the plan, however,
a contractor would still have to subject himself (absent a settlement with the contracting
officer) to both a trial before a Court of Claims commissioner and, since commissioner
decisions are not final, to a compulsory "appeal" to the court's judges. This suggestion
would also deprive the executive departments of much of the opportunity to settle disputes
internally in accord with their particular procurement policies and needs. Finally, since
the proposal would eliminate the concept of finality within the departments, it would open
up the possibility of broad scale GAO review.
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of the major objections to the present contract dispute machinery - the re-
dundant reviews of a contractor's case by the contract boards and the Court
of Claims, resulting in loss to both parties of time and money. The prerequisite
of this approach would be an improvement in contract board procedures: that
is, implementation of the kind of reforms supported by the advocates of com-
plete contract board finality. It might then be reasonable for the Court of
Claims to give deference to board decisions by limiting its review and by in-
dulging a presumption in favor of the validity of a board's finding similar to
that afforded independent administrative agencies. The law-fact criterion would
be dispensed with as a guide to the allocation of jurisdiction: the board would
consider the total problem presented, including questions of law such as breach
of contract, and the limited review by the Court of Claims would be on the
whole record."9 ' The substantial evidence test could meaningfully be applied
in the same way as in the administrative process, and no finality would be
accorded board decisions on questions of law. There are, however, several
possible objections to the meshing solution. To gain any significant advantage
from the meshing, the commissioner system would have to be by-passed and
a special appeal route constructed for this single class of Court of Claims cases.
Not only would this cause substantial dislocation to existing Court of Claims
procedures, but it might also add to the delay in the court's docket. The con-
tract boards, moreover, even with improved procedures, would still be subject
to criticism because of their lack of insulation from the executive department.
Finally, since the meshing proposal utilizes existing institutions, there could
be no guarantee that the present concern for institutional prerogatives would
be abandoned.
A second approach would abandon both the contract boards and review
by the Court of Claims in favor of a newly constituted specialized court.
Thus, several commentators 192 have suggested that the contract boards
might be done away with completely by providing that contractors be deemed
to have exhausted their remedies if the government had not settled their
claims within six months. The contractor's appeal from a contracting officer's
decision would be to a trial Court of Contract Appeals analogous to the
Tax Court. This new court, to be made up of former contract board members
and others experienced in the procurement field, would handle all government
contract disputes cases, whether arising from contractors' claims against the
191. And as in situations of appellate review of administrative agencies, no de novo
evidence would be taken.
192. The suggestion is most fully developed in Lidstone & Witte, Administration of
Government Contracts: Disputes and Claims Procedures, 46 VA. L. RExv. 252, 294-95
(1960). The idea of an administrative court is tentatively endorsed in Miller, supra note
179, at 136. The Nash Interview also emphasized the preferability of doing away with
contract boards and having a settlement-administrative court resolution of contract dis-
putes. This idea is not without broader precedent. The Hoover Commsision had recom-
mended a single Administrative Court of the United States, with Tax, Trade, and Labor
Sections. It left open the question of whether the latter two branches should be trial or
appellate. Except as otherwise indicated, the proposal discussed in the text is that of Lid-
stone and Witte.
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government or from contractor appeals from government deficiency assess-
ments.1 3 Appeal from the Court of Contract Appeals, as from the Tax Court,
would be to the appropriate circuit court of appeals. The plan clearly has
merit: simplification and elimination of delay and institutional friction. On
the other hand, it places a great deal of faith in the contracting officers and
the informal settlement process. The plan could be successful only if the
settlement process envisioned at the contracting officer level disposed of many
cases and if the proposed administrative court could provide as speedy and
inexpensive a remedy to contractors dissatisfied with contracting officers'
decisions as do present contract boards. It is at least questionable whether
the speed of the proposed trial court would be much greater than that of the
Court of Claims; it is also possible that if contractors flocked to the new court,
its docket would become intolerably crowded, and the availability of the forum
would be of little practical use.
A third possible solution, calling for major procedural reform of contract
dispute machinery, would be to reorganize the contract boards along the
lines of the approach taken recently by the Atomic Energy Commission.0 4
Following preliminary procedures similar to those of the ASBCA, through
which an appeal file is developed, the AEC provides for a trial de novo before
a hearing examiner qualified under the APA, at which law as well as fact
decisions are made, and at which the party making the claim has the burden
of proof. The hearing examiner's powers are broader than those of the ASBCA:
subcontractors are permitted direct appeal ;195 subpoenas may be issued by
the hearing examiner; and persons whose interests may be affected by the
decision may intervene. Commission review of the hearing examiner's de-
cision may be sought by the contractor or be certified by the commission.
The commission is empowered to consider all of the equities of a case, and
such questions of law, policy and discretion as it considers relevant.
While some commentators have had high praise for the AEC's procedure,
others have pointed out that the AEC hearing examiners handle a very small
number of cases, and have suggested that a larger case load might well cause
the hearing machinery to break down.10 6 It is difficult to' see, though, why
193. A contractor wishing to enforce a claim he had filed could petition either the
Court of Claims or the Court of Contract Appeals. Government actions for default would
be represented by deficiency notices similar to those issued by the Internal Rvenue Service
under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 6212. Lidstone & Witte, supra note 192, at 294.
194. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.400-2.440 (1963).
195. Subcontractors do not have direct appeal to the ASBCA. See Miller, supra note
179, at 125, discussing the relevant Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR)
3-903.5, and indicating the possibility of indirect appeal. See also Cuneo, Disputes between
Subcontractor and Prime Contractor under Government Contracts, 16 FED. BJ. 246
(1956).
196. Compare Miller, supra note 179, at 124; Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 290, 316
(1964), with Spector Interview. Another criticism, by the Chairman of the Interior De-
partment BCA, is that employing hearing examiners may mean the sacrifice of some of
the legal (and presumably also technical) know-how which has partly justified board
replacement. Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 290, 316 n.125 (1964).
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APA hearing examiners would take longer or be less effective in trying a
case than contract board members; and an ASBCA member's assertion that
putting that board under the APA would not substantially affect its oper-
ations suggests that those who criticize APA hearing examiner machinery
in the contract dispute context may be overstating their case.
The substitution of the AEC's procedures for the present machinery might
afford a remedy to the trend since Bianchi of trying to quasi-judicialize con-
tract boards. But it might also create an intolerable situation in which a
contractor who desired judicial review of his claim would have to wade
through four levels of hearings: AEC-type examiner, AEC-type commis-
sioner, Court of Claims commissioner (either reviewing the record or taking
de novo evidence), and Court of Claims judges. This time consuming double
scrutiny could, of course, be done away with by foreclosing Court of Claims
review. But the practical concerns which led Congress in the APA to provide
appellate review of agency decisions are surely equally applicable to the area
of government contract dispute adjudication, so it seems hardly likely that
Congress would want to carve out an exception to judicial review in this area.
2. Synthesizing the Administrative and Judicial Models:
A Proposed Solution
Each of the foregoing proposals for a unitary institution for resolution
of government contract disputes is subject to criticism; therefore, there is rea-
son for attempting to synthesize their best elements into a new proposal which,
hopefully, will avoid many of the objections raised against them.
Some general observations should first be made as to the characteristics
which any new institution - or system of institutions - for the resolution
of contract disputes ought to possess to meet the practical needs of the
parties. Several factors would initially indicate that the new system should
embody many of the characteristics usually attributed to the judicial process.
Resolving contract disputes seems to present an adjudicatory rather than a
legislative or administrative problem. The administrative process is charac-
terized by its policy making functions - the elaboration or application of
complicated regulatory schemes. Yet, presumably, the issues raised by contract
disputes are seldom foreign to general contract law; instead, the cases usu-
ally present questions of contract interpretation, a type of legal dispute tradi-
tionally placed within the competence and domain of courts. A second
consideration suggesting the adoption of a judicial approach grows out of
the immense amount of money involved in government contracts. This factor
has led inevitably to intense political competition in obtaining government
contracts; some of the political influence wielded here might carry over into
dispute resolution. 197 To prevent this occurrence, an institution wholly in-
197. See, e.g., Duscha, Arms and the Big Money Men, Harper's Magazine, March
1964, p. 39; The Costly Mysteries of Defense Spending, Harper's Magazine, April 1964,
p. 52; The Disarmament Bltes: Arms and the Big Money Men, Harper's Magazine,
May 1964, p. 56.
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dependent of political pressure, such as an Article III constitutional court,
whose judges enjoy life tenure, would seem appropriate. 198 Finally, the tech-
nicality of the subject matter and the political implications of a decision con-
tribute to the possibility that the significance of important decisions will not
be evident to the public at large; it is possible that abuse by lack of due
process might go unnoticed and uncorrected. This possible lack of publicity
in the contract dispute area might well be aggravated if decisions were made
within the confines of the administrative process. 9 9 These tendencies might
be prevented by placing the decision making power in an independent judicial
institution.2 00
On the other hand, merely giving jurisdiction of contract disputes to al-
ready constituted federal courts would preclude utilization of some of the
more desirable features of the administrative process.201 At the very least,
any new solution should try to preserve the virtues of the old: speed, rela-
tively low costs, the possibility of private settlement, and some measure of
intra-departmental finality to reduce the possibility of collateral attack by the
GAO. Placing jurisdiction within federal district courts, for example, would
sacrifice the technical knowledge and experience already possessed by the cur-
rent institutions. If jurisdiction were given to federal district courts, the uni-
formity in interpretation of standard contract clauses would be lost, to the
detriment of both parties to the contract. If, however, jurisdiction were placed
in a single court to gain uniform decisions, the opportunity for local hearings
would be lost, raising the litigative burden on both parties.
One feasible solution, drawing explicitly upon the previous proposals and
encompassing the desirable aspects of the judicial and administrative pro-
cesses, would be the establishment of a new system of contract resolution
operating on three levels: contracting officer, hearing officer, and appellate
court. The first level would be the contracting officer, who would continue
to administer contracts on a day-to-day basis and to seek settlements when
disputes arose. In order to keep the cost and volume of litigation of the
proposed system within reasonable limits, and to enable contractors to rely
on contracting officers' determinations, a binding quality should be retained
for their decisions.20 2 To ascribe finality to these decisions, though, is not
198. Cf. HAmILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 491-93 (Lodge ed. 1908).
199. Cf. 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 4.01-.03 (1958).
200. Courts have absolutely nothing to gain from their decisions, and they are not as
subject to outside pressures as agencies may be. And responsibility is imposed upon them
by the expectation that they will write reasoned opinions and the fact that they may not
invoke the doctrines of unreviewable discretion as easily as may administrative agencies.
201. While a theoretician views the administrative agencies as quasi-each-branch of
the Government, a laborer in the field of government practicalities has a different
view. To him agencies are power tools, of functional design....
PREIY mAN, TRIAL. BY AGENcy 5 (1959).
202. The contracting officer would handle all administrative problems, whether they
represented classical "cases or controversies" or not. During the time of contracting officer
determination and appeal, the contractor would be required to continue work. Should he
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only misdescriptive of the present legal situation, but may not be justified:
the contracting officer is often too involved in the life of the contract to be
regarded as a wholly impartial arbiter. Indeed, the officer's relationship with
the contractor is one that itself should be subject to disinterested scrutiny;
a contract officer might overpay in order to avoid being dragged into litigation,
or he might be overzealous in protecting the government's interests. For
this reason, a more realistic and appropriate label than "finality" should be
attached to the decisions of the contracting officer: "reviewable only for good
cause shown" conveys the sense, if not the precise legal term which should
be applied.
The contracting officer would continue to settle a large number of minor
disputes. But in cases where the contractor or the executive department is
so dissatisfied with the contracting officer's decision that intra-departmental
resolution is impossible, appeals would be made to a neutral official some-
what analogous to a hearing examiner under the APA, or a Court of Claims
commissioner. As envisaged, the hearing officer would be held to APA stand-
ards in the hearing and would be responsible for the building of a record. 20 3
The new hearing officer would also be able to conduct hearings in the field.
The hearing officer would, however, be given additional responsibility, differ-
entiating him from either APA hearing examiners or Court of Claims com-
missioners. Rather than being an employee of an agency or an officer of a
court, he would be given independent status similar to that of a trial court
judge.20 4 This independence would, hopefully, lead to greater impartiality
suffer damages in the course of an appeal by the government, he could receive them at
the same time as the validity of the government appeal is determined.
203. The status of the hearing officer under the APA as "judicial" officer reviewed
by courts is described by DAvIs, ADMINISTRATI LAW §§ 10.02-10.04 (1958). In prac-
tice, the scope of his deciding powers is limited by agency review. Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492-97 (1951), provided for some weight to be given to
the examiner's decision - but this weight necessarily was tempered by the deference to
be given to the agency decision. Davis concludes that "the plain fact is that examiner's
functions remain subordinate," and recommends their strengthening, e.g., through raising
pay. DAvis, op. cit. supra at § 10.05.
The American Bar Association has pressed for the increase in the status and separation
of function of the hearing examiner from the agency. See Benjamin A Lawyer's View of
Administrative Procedure - The American Bar Association Program, 26 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 203, 228-30 (1961).
204. The use of hearing officers in the way proposed bears a strong resemblance to
the type of trade court proposal developed by the American Bar Association, which would
embody the adjudicatory functions of the Federal Trade Commission in a court which
was part of the judicial branch (i.e., an Article III court like the Court of Claims). See
PRErT MAN, op. cit. supra note 201, at 51-52; Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions
from Federal Trade Commission to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 Mica.
L. REv. 199 (1960). See also the proposal of a court analogous to the Tax Court, Lid-
stone & Witte, supra note 192, at 294-95. (The ABA proposal, 81 A.B.A. REP. 491, 495,
Resolution 4.1 (1956), would make the Tax Court part of the judicial branch.)
Fundamentally, there would appear to be two criticisms of this proposal as applied in
the government contracts area. First, that the hearing officers would lack the expertise of
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and would encourage the recruitment of able personnel. More important,
the hearing officer would render decision on all of the issues presented in
the case, both issues of fact and law. Lastly, the officer's opinion would be
final unless appealed.
The judicial nature of the proceedings conducted at the hearing officer
level might deprive the process of some speed. But such time as would be
lost should be more than made up for by the elimination of the extra steps
and institutional overlap characterizing the current system, achieved through
merging the functions of the contract boards and the commissioners. Nor
need this combination of functions sacrifice experience and technical learning,
for hearing officers might readily be recruited from the ranks of the current
contract boards or the commissioners.
Appeals from a hearing officer's decision would be to a newly constituted
court of contract appeals, unaffiliated with any executive department or ad-
ministrative agency. Review of the hearing examiner would be on the record,
contract board members, and would be less efficient. See, e.g., the criticism of the A.E.C.
system, note 196 supra and accompanying text. Much of this criticism might be met by
having "sections" of hearing examiners, who handled unique cases: e.g., atomic agency,
weapons systems. For the handling of general construction contract cases, which presently
arise frequently in several contract boards, no such division of labor would be necessary.
A second more fundamental criticism of both the approach taken and of the Bar As-
sociation approach is that it represents the creation of a false dichotomy between regu-
lation (embodying policy formation) and adjudication:
Many policies must be forged in the case-by-case mill .... Many policies must be
developed gradually, moving from problem to problem and observing the effects of
prior decisions. Without this process, some rules may be meaningless or so rigid
that they defeat some of their own purposes.
Massel, The Regulatory Process, 26 LAw & CoNrEmp. PROB. 181, 188 (1961). This com-
mentator, however, also emphasized the interaction of parties that takes place in the for-
mulation of administrative policies:
[T]he regulated industry participates in policy formulation through its pressures
for changes in policy and through the information and arguments that it presents
to the Congress, the agency, and the courts in individual cases; and much of the
policy development depends upon judicial interpretations.
Ibid. (emphasis added).
In the light of this second comment, it is clear that the criticism offered of reformers
of the administrative process is inapt in the contract disputes context. Procurement policies
are not handled by the contract boards, though they necessarily have a feed-back effect on
them. Judicial decisions certainly affect the shape of administrative law; the extent to
which the shape of government contracts is designed to minimize this very impingement
on government policies runs counter to this trend. As indicated by Pasley, The Interpre-
tation of Government Contracts: A Plea for Better Understanding, 25 FORDEAm L. REv.
211 (1956), the form of government contract clauses is affected by private pressure, but
it is doubtful for whose benefit this pressure primarily works. See the comments of Lid-
stone & Witte, supra at 252-56. It is submitted that while there may be merits in the
position of the critics of what has been termed (by them) the "judicialization" of the
"administrative process," their arguments do not have telling impact in the government
contract disputes area, because what is involved is clearly the judicialization of an essen-
tially judicial process.
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and the law-fact distinction would, of course, be applied. Review on questions
of law would be similar to the appellate review of district courts on questions
of law. Review of questions of fact might be governed either by the Wunder-
lich Act standards, primarily "substantial evidence," or the "clearly erroneous"
standard commonly used in review of courts sitting without jury.
2 0 5
Use of the law-fact distinction would seem feasible once the institutional
frictions implicit in the current system were removed. A needed degree of
experience and technical competence could be assured the court if its judges
were selected from the existing institutions for resolving government contract
disputes.
200
The function of hearing contract appeals might alternatively be assigned
to the Court of Claims. There are, however, several objections to this proposal.
Special provision would have to be made to eliminate the commissioners
from the appeal process, or the functions of the commissioners would have
to be redrawn to equal the duties of the proposed hearing officers. Either
alternative would require a major revision of existing Court of Claims
procedures in the area of contract disputes. Nor would either of these alter-
natives solve the problem of the three year docket delay. Finally, retention
of the Court of Claims' jurisdiction, coupled with abolition of the contract
boards, might result in a hostile reaction to the entire plan by the executive
departments affected.
Another distinguishing characteristic of the proposed court would be that
the executive department party to the contract might appear as plaintiff.
Elimination of the contract boards and the opportunity to secure intra-depart-
mental settlement which they presented 20 7 would seem to require that the
government be able to appeal to the hearing officer from a contracting officer's
decision. This right to appeal would stem not only from the department's
position as party to the contract, but also would give the department a chance
to vindicate and enforce its procurement policies as embodied in its contracts.
A further corollary of the department's right to appeal at all stages would
be the elimination of GAO right to review; since the department could easily
vindicate its interests within the proposed system, there would be no reason
to retain the possibilities of collateral attack at the instigation of either the
parties or the GAO itself.
205. It has been suggested that this test may be appropriate in reviewing the ad-
ministrative agencies. See ABA Procedure Report, at 506-07. See also Jaffe, supra note
169, at 1040-44. Cf. District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U.S. 698 (1944). But compare
DAvis, op. cit. supra note 164, at § 29.
206. Special expertise can, moreover, be furthered in appropriate instances through
the process of specialized litigation in which the executive departmert, familiar with the
field and with adequate powers of investigation, can present all relevant factors for con-
sideration by the specialized court. Cf. ABA Procedure Report, at 513.
207. At present, while contract officers may settle disputes, the department heads and
their representatives are precluded from doing so. Cf. Cramp & Sons v. United States,
216 U.S. 494 (1910). But see Shedd, Administrative Authority to Settle Clains for Breach
of Government Contract, 27 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 481 (1959).
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A final implication of the proposal would be the centralization of all contract
disputes within the proposed system.2 0 8 There would no longer be any reason
to maintain jurisdiction in the district courts over any department claims or
contractors' claims under $10,000. Similarly, all possible overlap between
the proposed system and the Court of Claims should be eliminated. This
would necessarily mean that all breach of contract cases would be handled
by the proposed system. This centralization would also have several bene-
ficial consequences. It would eliminate the last possible source of jurisdictional
friction by obviating all need for distinguishing between cases labeled breach
of contract or question of interpretation. Finally, the creation of a unitary
system embodying comprehensive jurisdiction and a single road to appeal
would probably eliminate any administrative inefficiencies caused by the cur-
rent system of alternate appeal routes. No longer will either party run the risk
of choosing the wrong route; and the district courts will not have to grapple
with technical factual questions presented in government contract cases.
The establishment of a judicial forum in which both parties may litigate
contract disputes is a recognition of the partial validity of old "freedom of
contract" cases which recognized that executive departments acting in the
government contract area are, in a sense, "private orderers" - though of
an unusual sort. Hearing examiners are common in the administrative pro-
cess and they have played some role in the government contracts area. The
use of judicial type officers to handle essentially adjudicatory questions previ-
ously in the province of administrative agencies has been urged by the
American Bar Association. It is submitted that only by the fusion of these
approaches, and the concomitant elimination of institutional frictions can the
Wunderlich cycle be satisfactorily terminated.
208. Contractors are currently bound by their contracts to observe numerous "policy"
provisions, influencing their hiring practices, labor conditions, and business ethics. See
CUJNEO, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS HANDBOOK 5-9 (1962); Hannah, Government Buying
Erodes Management, Harv. Bus. Rev. 57-61 (May-June 1964).
The penalty for violation of these public policy clauses may be either suspension or
debarment. The procedures within the executive departments leading to the application
of these sanctions has been sketchy. For criticism of them, and proposal for reform, see
Administrative Conference of the United States, Debarment and Suspension of Bidders
on Government Contracts and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 5
BosToN COLLEGE IND. & Com. L. Rzv. 89 (1963). The courts have begun to awaken to
the contractor's right of due process in debarment proceedings. See Copper Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Gonzalez v. Freeman, No. 17765,
D.C. Cir. (May 17, 1964). Cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
The debarment problem might also be an appropriate one for the proposed court struc-
ture to handle. Compare Administrative Conference of the United States, supra at 283
(proposal of single debarment board for the Department of Defense: ASBCA would be
acceptable).
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